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BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF THE NAFTA
TREATY DEBATE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN
MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATESt
STEPHEN F. BEFORTtt AND VIRGINIA E. CORNETTtftt
In the United States, a significant part of the debate over passage
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)' focused on
the agreement's potential effects on the American worker. United States
labor organizations and their congressional supporters opposed NAFTA
based on their belief that Mexico's low wages and minimal worker
protection would entice U.S. companies to move to Mexico, resulting
in a loss of American jobs.2 An underlying assumption of their
argument was that Mexican labor laws were either inadequate to protect
workers' interests or inadequately enforced.
" The authors thank Anne Johnson and Alfredo GonzAlez Cambero for editorial assistance and
comments and Laura Pfeiffer for research assistance.
tt Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
ttt J.D. 1994, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 296, 32
I.L.M. 605 (1993). Although Canada was also a signatory of NAFTA, in this article the authors discuss
only the United States and Mexico.
2. For example, at a congressional panel meeting in September 1993, Teamster Vice President
Dennis Skelton claimed that NAFTA "will cause massive job loss" in the United States. Can the Labor
Side Agreement Save NAFTA?: Hearings Before the Employment, Housing, and Aviation House
Subcom. of the Comm. on Government Operations, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (Sept. 9, 1993, Oct. 7,
1993). United Steelworkers International President, Lynn R. Williams, said that NAFTA would result
in an "unacceptable loss ofjobs" in the United States and "wage depression and lower living standards
for American workers." Id. at 27.
3. Representative William Ford (D-Mich.), Chair of the House Education and Labor Committee,
argued that "Mexican health and safety and other standards are much weaker than American counter-
parts" and that American and Mexican labor law are "generations, decades, and maybe centuries" apart.
Members of Congress, Union Leaders Speak out against NAFTA Side Agreements, Int'l Env't Daily
(BNA), Sept. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAIED File [hereinafter Members of
Congress]. Other critics, such as Senator Ernest Hollings for Foreign Policy, acknowledged the
existence of tough labor laws in Mexico but argued that they are not enforced. Ernest F. Hollings,
Reform Mexico First, 93 FOREIGN POL'Y 91, 100 (1993-94). In contrast, Stephen Zamora analyzed the
debate in the United States itself, exposing and questioning the assumption of the debaters that Mexico
should be pressured to "Americanize"-to adopt a legal, political and economic system more like that
of the United States. See generally Stephen Zamora, The Americanization of Mexican Law: Non-Trade
Issues in the North American Free Trade Agreement, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 391 (1993).
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In response to opposition by U.S. labor, the NAFTA signatories
negotiated a side agreement4 to ensure the protection of workers' rights
in all three countries. This agreement establishes a tripartite commis-
sion empowered to hear complaints brought by any interested party that
alleges that an employer is violating the labor laws of the country in
which work is being performed.5 The side agreement, however, did not
satisfy U.S. labor, and American unions continued to oppose NAFTA.6
In spite of this opposition, the U.S. Congress ratified the trade
agreement in November 1993. 7 Because the labor side agreement tries
to ensure that each signatory country enforces its own laws, one purpose
of this article is to provide practical information about Mexican labor
law to U.S. labor and American companies doing business in Mexico.
This piece also has another purpose in attempting to rectify the
many misperceptions regarding Mexican labor law. Much of the
rhetoric used during the NAFTA debate was based on stereotypes about
Mexico, which perpetuated misunderstanding and resentment between
the two countries.' Since NAFTA's passage, a number of articles have
explored aspects of Mexican labor law more deeply than earlier reports,
but all maintain the assumption that deliberate Mexican Government
policy causes inadequate enforcement of Mexican labor law.9 Also im-
4. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M.
1499 (1993) [hereinafter NAALC].
5. NAALC, art. 4 (Private Action), art. 8 (The Commission), arts. 27-48 (Resolution of Disputes
& General Provisions).
6. Walter Shea, president of the transportation trades department of the AFL-CIO, claimed that
the side agreement was "totally inadequate" and that it protected the concerns of investors more than
the interests of American or Mexican workers. The agreement, he said, fails to protect the rights of
workers to "freely associate, participate in collective bargaining, strike, or be protected from forced
labor." Members of Congress, supra note 3. In fact, as this article discusses later, both Mexican and
U.S. law protect these rights. Under NAALC, however, possible violations of the right to organize and
freely associate are subject to consultations and review by the NAALC council, but not to the
imposition of the sanctions possible for other violations. NAALC, supra note 4, arts. 27-41. See also
Daily Labor Report, Current Developments, NAO Decides to Review Union Charges Against Honeywell,
General Electric, Apr. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cumws File.
7. David E. Rosenbaum, House Backs Free Trade Pact in Major Victory for Clinton After a
Long Hunt for Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1993, at Al; Adam Clymer, Senate Approves Brady
Legislation and Trade Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1993, at 1.
8. During the NAFTA debates, Raul Yzaguirre, President of the National Council of La Raza,
warned that "Mexico bashing and race baiting are becoming the weapons of choice among critics of
the NAFTA treaty." He quoted AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland as saying that child labor in Mexico
rivals "any of the well-publicized disasters of the worst Stalinist regimes." Hispanic Leader Warns
NAFTA Debate Drifting into "Evil Mixture of Prejudice and Ignorance "; Political Counterattack to
Focus on Merits, PR Newswire, May 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnws File.
9. See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Crandall, Comment, Will NAFTA's North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation Improve Enforcement of Mexican Labor Laws?, 7 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 165, 177
(1994) ("In order to ... prevent adverse effects on foreign investment, the Mexican government
adopted a hands-off approach to enforcing labor regulations."); Amy H. Goldin, Comment, Collective
Bargaining in Mexico: Stifled by the Lack of Democracy in Trade Unions, 11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 203,
209-10 (1990) (discussing the longevity of labor leaders, "cooptation" of those leaders by the
NAFTA
plicit in these articles and others is the assumption that U.S. law is
superior to Mexican law and adequately protects the interests of U.S.
workers.
In reality, Mexican labor law provides the same basic rights and
protections to Mexican workers that U.S. law provides to U.S. workers.
Beyond those basics, and in contrast to the implications of much of the
anti-NAFTA rhetoric, Mexican labor law is in many ways more
protective of workers than U.S. law,'0 and Mexican unions are more
powerful than their American counterparts." This article compares
U.S. and Mexican labor and employment law in order to test the
assumption that U.S. law is superior. The results of this comparison
may surprise many and may help to clarify the strengths and weaknesses
of both systems. The analysis suggests that both countries may need to
adjust to a more integrated international economic environment in order
to protect workers' interests effectively. 2
Since the authors wrote this article primarily for a U.S. audience,
the sections on U.S. labor and employment are briefer than those
discussing the Mexican system. In Part I, this work first presents a
short history of labor relations and the principles and sources of labor
and employment law in each country. In Parts II and III, it discusses
and compares the statutory regulations and associational rights that each
system provides. In Part IV, the article addresses the methods and
institutions which the two countries have established to enforce those
rights. Parts V and VI analyze the current and future effectiveness of
each country's system in protecting workers' interests.
government, and corruption as a means of controlling labor demands); Charles W. Nugent, Comment,
A Comparison of the Right to Organi:e and Bargain Collectively in the United States and Mexico:
NAFTA's Side Accords and Prospects for Reform, 7 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 197, 213 (1994) ("'official'
unions ... tend to be conciliatory towards employers in the collective bargaining process, reflecting
the PRI's policy of maintaining low wages to attract foreign investment."); Susanna Peters, Comment,
Labor Law for the Maquiladoras: Choosing Between Workers' Rights and Foreign Investment, 11
COMP. LAB. L.J. 226, 247 (1990) ("Many maquila workers believe that the government and [the
predominant labor union] have a greater desire to appease foreign manufacturers than to campaign for
workers.").
10. See Zamora, supra note 3, at 18.
11. Id. at 18, 27. An estimated 25% to 30% of Mexico's private sector work force is unionized.
U.S. Dep 't of Labor, Foreign Labor Trends, Mexico 1991-1992, at 2 (1992) [hereinafter Foreign Labor
Trends]. In the United States, the comparable number is 11.5% of the work force. 142 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 180-81 (1993). Also, Mexico's labor sector has more political influence than the labor sector
in the United States. See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
12. Through this article, the authors hope to initiate an informed discussion of the differences in
approaches to labor relations in Mexico and the United States and how those differences have affected
the protections and benefits which workers receive. The article's broadness in scope necessarily limits
the depth of discussion of any particular issue.
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I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, AND SOURCES
OF LAW
A. Mexico
1. Labor Relations History
The current labor relations system in Mexico emerged out of the
1910 Mexican Revolution. Prior to the Revolution, Mexico followed
a laissez-faire model of labor relations similar to that of the United
States. The Mexican government seldom intervened in affairs between
labor and management, and when it did so, it usually reacted hostilely
toward labor.'3 However, the influence of Mexico's working and
peasant classes in the Revolution broke that country from its laissez-
faire tradition and redirected it on a path of labor relations development
quite different from that of the United States. The Program of Reform
adopted in October 1915 included the regulation of working conditions
and recognition of the legal status of unions and the right to strike,
14
rights not guaranteed in the United States for another twenty years.
15
The national constitution adopted in 191716 went further, explicitly
abandoning traditional laissez-faire principles concerning relations
between labor and capital 7 and recognizing the existence of class
conflict and inequality. 8 The new constitution provided guarantees for
the economically weak and formulated an arbitral role for the state in
conflicts between labor and capital.' 9 Mexico's Constitution of 1917
was the first constitution in the world to include such social guaran-
tees.20
Labor relations in Mexico in the 1920s and 1930s were often
13. For a description of some of the violent clashes between labor and the Mexican government
at that time, see Jost MANUEL LASTRA LASTRA, DERECHO SINDICAL 89-91 (1991).
14. Id. at 97.
15. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
16. CONSTITUC16N POLiTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS. [Constitution]
17. See Graciela BensusAn, Construccidn y desarollo de derecho laboral en Mixico, in 4 EL
OBRERO MEXICANO: EL DERECHO LABORAL 9, 10 (Pablo GonzAlez Casanova et al. eds., 1985).
18. See JUAN B. CLIMENT BELTRAN, LEY FEDERAL DEL TRABAJO: COMENTARIOS Y JURISPRU-
DENCIA 36-37 (7th ed. 1993). James Smith, in comparing the Mexican and U.S. Constitutions, noted,
"[tihe Mexican Constitutional Convention, unlike the Philadelphia Convention over a century earlier,
addressed economic and social goals and rights, equating social justice with-if not elevating it
over-individual liberty." James F. Smith, Confronting Differences in the United States and Mexican
Legal Systems in the Era of NAFTA, 1 U.S. MEXICO L.J. 85, 94 (1993).
19. Bensusdn, supra note 17, at 10.
20. VICTOR MOZART RUSSOMANO & MIGUEL BERMUDEZ CISNEROS, DERECHO DEL TRABAJO (EL
EMPLEADO Y EL EMPLEADOR) 29 (1990); BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS/ASOCIACION DE JEFES DE
RELACIONES INDUSTRIALES, MEXICO: POLITICA Y PRACTICA LABORAL/LABOR POLICY AND PRACTICE
54 (1985) [hereinafter LABOR POLICY AND PRACTICE].
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turbulent. Unions fought among themselves over membership and
ideology and for influence in government.2' In 1938, President Ldzaro
C6rdenas reorganized the official ruling party,22 responding to the labor
unrest by officially incorporating the labor sector into the new party.23
Union leaders at this time sought an alliance with the government in
order to ensure the growth of union power through direct participation
in the emerging political system. Cirdenas formed an alliance with
the then-dominant Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Mgxico (CTM),25
thus cementing the Mexican labor relations system that survives
today.26
The CTM remains the largest and most influential labor confedera-
tion in Mexico.27 Considered to be the leader of the labor movement
in Mexico and one of the nation's half-dozen most powerful leaders,28
Fidel Veldzquez became Secretary-General of the CTM in 1941 and has
since retained that position for all but one year.29  Traditionally,
21. See generally IAN ROXBOROUGH, UNIONS AND POLITICS IN MEXICO 13-20 (1984).
22. The party was founded under President Plutarco Elias Calles in 1929 as the Partido Nacional
Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Party). Cirdenas reorganized it and changed its name to the
Partido de la Revoluci6n Mexicana (Party of the Mexican Revolution, or PRM). See GEORGE W.
GRAYSON, THE MEXICAN LABOR MACHINE: POWER, POLITICS, AND PATRONAGE 14, 83 (1989). The
PRM became the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in 1946 under President Miguel Alem~n.
See FRANK BRANDENBURG, THE MAKING OF MODERN MEXICO 101 (1964).
23. Students of the Mexican political system often label the system "corporatist." A corporatist
structure allows the government to exert extraordinary control over all sectors of society. Some
commentators distinguish the Mexican political system from other corporatist systems by explaining that
the ruling party in Mexico governs by consensus, organizing and mobilizing the working and peasant
classes, thereby attaining a high degree of legitimacy. See ROXBOROUGH, supra note 21, at 166.
Stephen Zamora quotes ROBERTO NEWELL & Luis RUBIO, MEXICO'S DILEMMA: THE POLITICAL
ORIGINS OF ECONOMIC CRISIS 63 (1984): "The case of Mexico is without doubt one of authoritarianism
with relatively infrequent resort to coercion. Most of its authoritarianism stems from its enormous
capacity to deliver and to be responsive to 'popular' demands, while exercising political control."
Zamora, supra note 3, at 449 n.199. The recent 1994 election may lead to a reassessment of the
Mexican political system. The PRI presidential candidate won a plurality of the votes in an election
which observers, although acknowledging some irregularities in the election, determined to represent
the will of the people. See Tod Robberson, Zedillo Claims Victory in Mexican Vote: Result Seen
Ensuring Smooth Transition, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1994, at Al.
24. See Graciela Bensusdn, Libertad sindical: cambio real o aparente en el escenario laboral, in
MODERNIDAD Y LEGISLACI6N LABORAL 22, 26-27 (Graciela BensusAn & Carlos Garcia eds., 1989).
25. GRAYSON, supra note 22, at 14, 83 (stating that "individuals automatically became PRM
members by virtue of their affiliations with mass organizations such as CTM constituent unions").
26. Id. at 100.
27. See, e.g., Dora Delgado, NAOs Deterring Would-Be Violators of Labor Laws, Mexican
Official Says, Int'l Bus. Fin. Daily (BNA) (Oct. 26, 1995). A larger PRI-affiliated umbrella
organization, the Congreso del Trabajo (CT), was organized in 1966. See ROXBOROUGH, supra note
21, at 25. The CT is now affiliated with the PRI. See, e.g., LABOR, MEXICO Bus. MONTHLY, Aug.
1994. CTM is the dominant member of the CT. See Beatriz Garcia Peralta & Manuel Perlo Cohen,
Estado, sindicalismo oficial y politicas habitacionales: andlisis de una ddcada del INFONA VIT, in 2
EL OBRERO MEXICANO: CONDICIONES DE TRABAJO 108 (Pablo GonzAlez Casanova et al. eds., 1984)
[hereinafter 2 OBRERO MEXICANO].
28. See GRAYSON, supra note 22, at 64; see also Foreign Labor Trends, supra note 11, at 9.
29. See GRAYSON, supra note 22, at 64.
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Velhzquez and the labor sector have significantly influenced the PRI's
selection of presidential candidates, and through that influence, they
have kept labor's agenda in the forefront of national policy.30  As one
analyst states, this official unionism is a fundamental foundational
support of the PRI and a principal axle of the Mexican political
system. 1
2. Fundamental Principles of Mexican Labor Law
The Mexican legal system generally is non-adversarial in nature.
Based on a political tradition of cooperation and hierarchical manage-
ment, it emphasizes conciliation rather than competition. The Mexican
labor law system attempts to protect workers as a class, in contrast to
the U.S. system which promotes the protection of individual rights.
This legal philosophy is reflected in Mexican labor law itself; the
government has granted federal agencies a large role in regulation and
dispute resolution, and it emphasizes worker rights at the expense of
management rights.32
Labor law in Mexico recognizes the inequality in power between
labor and capital and attempts to limit the impact of this inequality.33
The norms of Mexican labor law, therefore, have a guardian and
30. "As he has for every election year since the 1930's, Mr. Velizquez ... played a role in
influencing the selection of the party's candidate." Anthony De Palma, Mexico's Unions, Frail Now,
Face Trade Pact Blows, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1993, at A3.
31. Javier Aguilar Garcia, Los sindicatos nacionales, in 3 EL OBRERO MEXICANO: ORGANIZACI6N
Y SINDICALISMO 181 (1985). See also Zamora, supra note 3, at 449-450 (explaining that "[riather than
providing a vigorous, independent representation of workers' interests, labor unions have served to
organize labor into a pillar of support for the PRI. Without the active support of labor unions, the PRI
would not have survived in power through the disastrous economic trials of the 1980's").
Labor plays a somewhat similar role in Europe, however, where the equivalent of a labor party
participates directly in the political system. In fact, according to Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers, "the
U.S. is anomalous in its lack of institutions linking workers in the political system." While in Western
Europe, "social democratic or labor parties govern countries regularly," in the United States, "labor's
main route of influence is through special interest lobbying rather than through direct electoral power,"
resulting in the "relative political weakness of American labor." Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers,
Who Speaks for Us?, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 13,
39 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993).
32. For further discussion, see infra part IV.
33. See CLIMENT BELTRAN, supra note 18, at 43. Referring to Mexican labor law as "social law,"
Climent Beltrhn explains that "[s]ocial justice is carried out through social law; it is concrete justice,
tangible and actual protection of the worker." Id. The law does not approach a person's labor as simply
a commodity to buy and sell. The subject of labor, the human being, instead is entitled to respect and
protection. Id. at 36; see also La Ley Federal de Trabajo (L.F.T.), art. 3, which states,
work is a social right and social obligation. It is not an article of commerce: it requires
respect for the freedoms and dignity of the person performing it and it should be carried out
under conditions protecting the life, the health and a decent standard of living for the worker
and his family.
Id. at 42. Article 2 of the federal labor law states that the norms of labor law are intended to maintain
equilibrium and social justice in the relations between workers and employers.
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humanitarian character -which seeks to protect the worker.34 This
concept of labor law restricts traditional liberal legal concepts in three
basic ways. First, it limits laissez-faire notions of freedom of contract.
The Mexican Constitution and the federal labor law establish many
basic rights and conditions of work that labor contracts may embellish
but never diminish. Second, it affirmatively recognizes the freedom
of association, the right to bargain collectively, and the right to
strike.36 Finally, it provides for judicial partiality. Both substantive
and procedural aspects of Mexican labor law expressly favor workers
over employers.37
3. Sources of Law
As a civil law system, legislation, not jurisprudence, plays the
primary role in establishing Mexico's legal rules. The Mexican
Constitution, for example, is much more specific than its U.S. counter-
part.38  Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution, which governs labor
relations, is divided into two sections. Part A covers private sector
employees, and Part B applies to public workers.39
Part A has thirty-one subsections which establish specific regula-
tions and benefits such as the eight-hour work day, the minimum wage,
maternity leave, profit-sharing, health and safety regulations, employer-
provided housing, and worker's compensation. The constitution
prohibits child labor and wage discrimination based on sex or nationali-
ty. Part A also grants to both labor and capital the right to organize and
the right to strike or to lockout.40
The Ley Federal de Trabajo (L.F.T.), or federal labor law,4
implements the articles of the constitution.42 For all workers, this law
34. See CLIMENT BELTRAN, supra note 18, at 36.
35. See id. The substantive mandates are discussed infra part II.
36. See CLIMENT BELTRAN, supra note 18, at 36; see also infra part 111.
37. See CLIMENT BELTRAN, supra note 18, at 37, 44.
38. The Mexican Constitution is a living document, having been amended over 350 times since
its inception in 1917. See Smith, supra note 18, at 95 n.53. The federal labor law contains over 1,000
articles. Discussed at length infra.
39. The federal labor law discussed below applies to the private sector. The public sector has a
separate set of regulations, La Ley de los Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado (Law of State Workers),
which include most of the same basic rights and benefits as the private sector laws. However, the
public sector laws place restrictions on strikes, as in the United States. See infra note 165.
40. MEX. CONST. arts. 123 A I, III, V-VII, IX, XII, XIV-XVII.
41. DIARIO OFICIAL DE LA FEDERACION (D.O.), translated in 25 COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE
WORLD; MEXCo: LABOR LAWS 1 (Foreign Tax Law Publishers, Inc. 1993).
42. See LABOR POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 55. The constitution, article 123,
§ XXXI, names 22 types of industries or services considered to be under federal authority. Generally,
they are the most important industries, such as textiles, electric, cinematography, rubber, sugar, and
mining. Also under federal jurisdiction are businesses that are administered by the federal government,
have contracts with or concessions from the federal government, or are located in federal zones or
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establishes the minimum work conditions,43 the rules of association
and collective bargaining, and the process of conflict resolution through
the labor tribunals. The sections that follow discuss these provisions."
B. The United States
The extent of government involvement in labor relations clearly
distinguishes the U.S. and Mexican systems. As in Mexico, labor and
employment law in the United States evolved out of a laissez-faire
tradition in which the federal and state governments did little to regulate
the employment relationship. While Mexico has abandoned this laissez-
faire model, the United States continues to embrace it. For example,
the U.S. Constitution remains wholly silent on the topic of labor-
management relations and workers' rights. Also, while the govern-
ment's regulation of labor and employment law has grown substantially
over the past quarter of a century, the U.S. workplace still remains far
less subject to governmental control than do workplaces in Mexico and
most of the industrialized world.
The nature of the government's role in the U.S. workplace is also
different. In Mexico, the constitution and federal labor law establish the
government as an active participant in labor relations. Thus, the
Mexican government frequently intervenes in labor-management
relations either as a mediator or a protector of workers' rights.45 In
contrast, the U.S. legislative scheme presupposes an adversarial
relationship between labor and management in which the government
jurisdictions or in territorial waters or exclusive economic zones of the nation. In addition, federal
jurisdiction controls any conflict that affects two or more states, or law contract that involves two or
more states, as well as employer obligations involving education, training, and health and safety. All
other conflicts involving the application of the L.F.T. are to be resolved by the local authorities.
43. See generally CLIMENT BELTRAN, supra note 18; CLEMENTE SOTO ALVAREZ, PRONTuARIO
DE DERECHO DEL TRABAJO (1991); OSCAR GABRIEL RAMOS ALVAREZ, TRABAO Y SEGURIDAD SOCIAL
(1991).
Article 352 of the L.F.T. indicates that it does not apply to family businesses operated only by
family members, except for health and safety matters. See SECRETARiA DEL TRABAJO Y PREVISION
SOCIAL & U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN MEXICO, Occasional Paper No. 1 (Sept.
1992). Because there is a significant informal sector in Mexico, comprised of mostly individual owners
with two or fewer workers, many workers do not enjoy the full protection of the labor law. Id. at 22.
The sector is largely made up of artisans, small business owners, and salespersons. Id. at 34. A 1988
survey estimated that informal employment comprises between 26 percent and 38 percent of the
nonagricultural work force. Id. at 53.
44. Mexico is also a signatory to 75 International Labor Organization conventions governing
workers rights and working conditions. Article 17 of the L.F.T. incorporates such conventions directly
into Mexican law. In contrast, the United States has ratified only 11. See 7 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANISATION, WORLD LABOUR REPORT 100 (1994).
45. See infra part IV.
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participates only as a neutral regulator. 46
The employment-at-will rule, which has prevailed in the American
workplace since the 1800s, embodies U.S. law's traditional "hands-off"
approach. Under this rule, an employer is free to discharge an
employee for any reason or no reason at all.
47
The first and still most significant limitation on the at-will rule in
the United States grew out of the labor movement. In 1935, Congress
enacted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 48 which provides
legal protection for employees engaged in union organization, collective
bargaining, and concerted activities such as strikes and picketing.
The NLRA regulatory model, which is discussed in more detail
below, 49 illustrates three fundamental characteristics of the U.S.
system. First, the NLRA regulates not the substance, but the process of
labor-management relations. The NLRA does not establish any of the
substantive terms of the employment relationship, but instead it provides
a procedural framework in which management and labor privately
determine these issues. Second, the process established by the NLRA
is adversarial-each party is expected to use economic coercion to
influence the outcome. Third, under the NLRA, the government is a
neutral referee that neither takes sides nor participates in the collective
bargaining process.
The role of labor in the U.S. political system also is distinct. Some
early American organizations, such as the Knights of Labor in the
1870S50 and the International Workers of the World51 some forty
years later, urged a broad platform of political and social reform like
their European and Mexican counterparts;52 however, the mainstream
46. See PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW 232 (1990).
47. The employment-at-will rule generally is traced to an 1877 treatise which stated the following:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at-will,
and if the servant seeks to make out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by
proof ... [l]t is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either party.
H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877). See generally
Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976)
(describing the development and historical antecedents of the employment-at-will rule).
48. The National Labor Relations Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1995). The original
version, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), is known colloquially as the Wagner Act.
49. See infra part III.B.
50. For an overview of the history and aims of the Knights of Labor, see LEON FINK,
WORKINGMEN'S DEMOCRACY: THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1983); JOSEPH G.
RAYBACK, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 142-68 (1974).
51. For an overview of the history and aims of the International Workers of the World, see
MELVYN DUBOFSKY, WE SHALL BE ALL: A HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKERS OF THE
WORLD (1969); DAVID MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CONTROL IN AMERICA 91-104 (1980).
52. Historically, Mexican unions were based on the European model. See LABOR POLICY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 61.
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of the American labor movement charted a very different course. The
American Federation of Labor (AFL), founded in 1886, advocated not
political upheaval, but economic empowerment. The AFL's mostly
craft worker members promoted "business unionism" to share in
capitalism's gains, not replace it altogether. 3 Thus, in contrast to the
CTM's partnership role with the ruling PRI party, organized labor in the
United States primarily functions as an independent, special interest
group.
Until the mid-1960s, the NLRA and the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA),54 which establishes minimum wage and overtime pay require-
ments, were the only two federal statutes that comprehensively regulated
the U.S. workplace. That situation, however, has changed significantly
with the enactment of a number of statutes over the past thirty years.
This wave of statutory enactments reflects a shift in focus from
collective to individual rights. The U.S. labor movement has ebbed,
with a fifty percent decline in the percentage of the work force that is
unionized." As the resulting impact of the NLRA has decreased, the
number of statutes regulating the individual employment relationship has
increased. These newer statutes fall into the following two basic
categories: (1) statutes that prohibit discrimination against members of
certain protected classes and (2) statutes that establish minimum
workplace requirements. 6
In spite of this proliferation of statutory enactments, the U.S.
workplace still remains far less regulated than workplaces in most
industrialized nations. Moreover, the at-will rule remains the presump-
tive employment arrangement in the United States57 and the norm for
most American workers.58
53. See LEwIS LORWIN, THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 44-54 (1970); SELIG PERLMAN,
HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES (1922).
54. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1995). For further discussion aboutthe Fair
Labor Standards Act, see infra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
55. The proportion of unionized employees in the nonagricultural work force has declined from
over 30% in 1960 to less than 16% in 1992. See Katherine van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial
Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining
System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 578 (1992); 142 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 180-81 (1993) (U.S.
Department of Labor reporting 1992 union membership at 15.8% of total wage and salary work force
and 11.5% of private sector work force).
56. See infra notes 102-106, 129 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Minn. 1983).
58. See generally Jack Stieber& Michael Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The Need
for a Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 319, 322-24 (1983) (estimating that 59 million private
sector employees are subject to the at-will rule and that 1.4 million of those employees are fired each
year).
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II. SUBSTANTIVE REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
A. Mexico
Mexican law provides considerable substantive regulation of the
employment relationship. In fact, Mexican statutes require employers
to provide a number of benefits that U.S. employees typically obtain
only at the bargaining table, if at all.
The Mexican federal labor law establishes the minimum standards
that apply to all workers covered by the law, regardless of the existence
of union representation or a union contract. Mexican workers may
bargain for greater benefits, but in no case may they bargain away or
lessen the minimum standards established by law.5 9 Further, Mexican
law mandates that these standards be applied without discrimination
based on race, nationality, sex, age, religious creed, or political
opinion.60
1. Wage and Hour Regulation
The L.F.T. legislates the maximum hours an employee may work
and the overtime rate of pay. The traditional work day in Mexico is
eight hours, 61 with some exceptions for special workers or condi-
tions.61 Mexican law establishes a six-day, forty-eight hour work
week, with one day of paid rest, normally Sunday.63 The law also
establishes at least seven federal holidays, for which a worker must be
paid double if required to work.64
Overtime work beyond the basic eight-hour day may not exceed
three hours per day, three consecutive days a week; those hours must be
paid at double the hourly rate.65 A national commission composed of
representatives of labor, management, and the government establishes
minimum wage rates that vary among geographical regions and
professions.66
59. L.F.T. arts. 56-57.
60. Id. art. 56.
61. MEX. CONST. art. 123, pt. A, ch. I; L.F.T. arts. 60-61.
62. See, e.g., L.F.T. titles 5 (women and minors), 6 (special types of work); see also RAMOS
ALVAREZ, supra note 43, at 18, 20, 32-35.
63. MEX. CONST. art. 123, pt. A, ch. IV; L.F.T. arts. 69, 71.
64. Id. art. 74.
65. MEX. CONST. art 123, pt. A, ch. XI; L.F.T. arts. 66-67. If nine hours of overtime is exceeded
in one week, the employer must pay those hours at a 200% higher wage rate. Id. art. 68.
66. MEX. CONST. art. 123, pt. A, ch. VI; L.F.T. arts. 90-96. For example, in 1993, the minimum
wage in Nogales, Sonora, where many maquiladores (export plants owned by foreign companies) are
located, was about $4.75 per day. In Mexico City the minimum wage was the same. In Oaxaca, a
poorer southern state, the minimum wage was about $4.00 per day. INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE
19961
280 COMPARATIVE LABOR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:269
2. Fringe Benefits
The L.F.T. provides full-time workers with the right to a paid, six-
day vacation after one year of service with an employer.67  This mini-
mum vacation allowance increases by two days for each of the next four
years of service.68  Thereafter, the vacation allowance grows by two
days for every five years of additional service. 69  Part-time workers
have a right to vacation in proportion to the number of days worked
annually.7"
Mexican law requires that employers give their workers an annual
bonus of at least fifteen days' wages, payable before December 20. 7"
Longevity in service can further augment this bonus.72
Finally, Mexican law provides for annual profit-sharing bonuses.
A national tripartite commission calculates the percentage rate for these
bonuses.73 In 1985, the basic profit sharing rate was set at 10% of the
profits earned by the company.74
3. Discharge
Unlike U.S. law, Mexican labor law presumes that employment is
permanent unless the job is by nature temporary and the work agree-
ment states expressly that employment is for a specific project or a
determined time.75 The constitution itself provides that, other than for
ESTADiSTICA GEOGRAFfA E INFORMATICA, ANUARIO ESTADISTICO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS
MEXICANOS 103-04 (1993) [hereinafter ANUARIO ESTADiSTICO].
Deductions in the minimum wage may be made only to cover judicially decreed support payments,
rent payments for employer-provided housing, housing credits, and credits for employer-provided goods.
In the case of both employer-provided housing and goods, the deductions may not exceed 10% of the
salary. Additionally, the employee must freely agree to credits for goods provided by the employer.
MEX. CONST. art. 123, pt. A, ch. VIII; L.F.T. art. 97, with references to arts. 103, 110, 151. As will
be discussed later, low wages are common in developing countries and are a primary result of an
oversupply of labor. See infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
67. L.F.T. art. 76.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. art. 77.
71. Id. art. 87.
72. Id. art. 162.
73. MEX. CONST. art. 123, pt. A, ch. IX(a); L.F.T. arts. 117-25. The Comisi6n Nacionalpara
la Participaci6n de los Trabajadores en las Utilidades de las Empresas consists of representatives of
labor, management and the government. A labor organization or an employer may request that the
commission reevaluate the percentage. Id. art. 587. According to James Schlagheck, "profit sharing
is a long and well-established practice in Mexico. Fines enforcing corporate compliance make defacto
profit sharing commonplace." JAMES L. SCHLAGHECK, THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND LABOR
CLIMATE IN MEXICO 95-96 (1980). This profit-sharing right, however, does not include the right of
workers to participate in the administration or decision-making processes of the company. L.F.T. art.
131.
74. See CLIMENT BELTRAN, supra note 18, at 177.
75. L.F.T. arts. 35-37.
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a layoff due to economic reasons, an employee may be discharged from
his or her job only for just cause.7 6
Any discharged employee may contest the grounds for discharge
before a labor tribunal.77 If the tribunal finds a lack of cause, the
employer must either reinstate the employee or provide a severance
payment equivalent to three months' wages.78 Mexican law also obli-
gates an employer to provide this severance payment to employees laid
off for economic reasons, plus an additional twelve days of salary for
each year of service.7 9
4. Workplace Safety and Health
The Mexican Constitution requires that employers maintain a safe
and healthy working environment.8" Mexico's General Regulations on
Safety and Health in the Workplace (RGSHT), which implement this
obligation, are comparable to the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA). 8 The federal government regulates occupational safety
and health in all sectors, whether or not the industry is otherwise subject
to state or federal jurisdiction.82  In addition, small family-run busi-
nesses, which are exempt from most labor law provisions, are subject
to the occupational safety and health regulations.8 3
The Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare (STPS) sets workplace
safety and health standards. 84  Since 1978, tripartite advisory com-
missions made up of representatives from labor, management, and the
government have been established on the national and state levels to
study occupational illnesses and injuries and to recommend methods of
76. MEX. CONST. art. 123, pt. A, chs. XIX, XXII; L.F.T. arts. 47, 53. Causes that justify
discharge include: committing violence against the employer, compromising the security of the
establishment, revealing trade secrets, having more than three days ofunexcused absences in one month,
and incapacity. Id. Article 437 of the L.F.T. requires that reductions in force be carried out by
seniority.
77. MEX. CONST. art. 123, pt. A, chs. XXI, XXII; L.F.T. art. 48 (placing on the employer the
burden of proving just cause).
78. Id.
79. L.F.T. arts. 162 (individual contract), 436 (collective bargaining contract). In the event of
bankruptcy, employees must be paid salaries, benefits, and severance pay due them before any other
creditor may make a claim. MEX. CONST. art. 123, pt. A, ch. XXIII; L.F.T. arts. 113-114.
80. MEX. CONST. art. 123, pt. A, ch. XV.
81. See Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988). See also
MEXICAN SECRETARIAT OF LABOR AND SOCIAL WELFARE & U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A COMPARISON
OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO: AN
OVERVIEW, at vi (1992) [hereinafter COMPARISON OF OSH]. The RGSHT is a compilation of labor
legislation from the Constitution, the L.F.T., and other federal law and international agreements.
Numerous additional standards and instructions are then derived from the RGSHT. Id at 1-4.
82. See id. at v. See also supra note 42.
83. L.F.T. art. 352. See supra note 43.
84. COMPARISON OF OSH, supra note 81, at 1-4.
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prevention.85 STPS has a staff of inspectors who are responsible for
monitoring compliance with the regulations.8 6
A system of labor-management commissions enforces safety and
health standards in Mexico. Each workplace with more than ten
workers must have a company commission made up of labor and
management representatives.8 These commissions make recommenda-
tions for hazard control, investigate accidents and illnesses, and conduct
safety and health training. 8 If STPS finds noncompliance with safety
and health regulations, the commissions also make recommendations to
employers. STPS may impose sanctions for such noncompliance only
where an employer does not implement the changes recommended by
the commission.89
Commission surveys of workplace safety also are used to determine
the annual fee that an employer is charged for worker's compensation
insurance.90 Under Mexican law, employers contribute to a fund
administered by the Social Security Administration that indemnifies em-
ployees for work-related injuries or illnesses.9' If the injury or illness
is due to employer negligence, the tribunal may award up to 25%
additional compensation.92
5. Housing
Mexican labor law imposes a distinctive obligation on employers
to provide housing for their workers.93 With the exception of highly
compensated employees, 94 Mexican law requires employers either to
provide the housing directly or to pay a sum equal to 5% of their
85. Id. at 1-2.
86. NESTOR DE BuEN LOZANO & CARLOS E. BUEN UNNA, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A PRIMER ON
MEXICAN LABOR LAW 21 (1991) [hereinafter PRIMER]. For more detailed descriptions of RGSHT, see
Alan L. Rosas & Kenneth J. Salamon, American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico, A Tale of Two
Countries: Health and Safety Law in Mexico, BUSINESS MEXICO, Apr. 1994; COMPARISON OF OSH,
supra note 81, at 1-4.
87. COMPARISON OF OSH, supra note 81, at xi.
88. Id. Workplaces with more than 10 workers include about 20% of all enterprises and 80% of
all wage earners. ld.
89. Id. at vi.
90. The greater the rate of injury and illness in a particular workplace, the higher the insurance
premium. Id. at x-xi.
91. MEX. CONST. art 123, pt. A, ch. XIV; L.F.T. arts. 472-513. A worker or beneficiary may
receive up to 36 months of pay for total incapacitation and about 25 months of salary for death. Id.
arts. 495, 502.
92. L.F.T. art. 490; PRIMER, supra note 86, at 22.
93. MEX. CONST. art. 123, pt. A, ch. XII; L.F.T. art. 136.
94. An employer is exempt from this obligation with respect to employees who receive compensa-
tion more than ten times the minimum wage. L.F.T. art. 144.
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workers' salaries into a national workers' housing fund.95  This
financial pool enables workers to obtain sufficient credit to acquire
comfortable housing if they are not provided it directly by the employ-
er.
96
6. Social Security and Health Care
The social security system in Mexico 97 covers many costs besides
those arising from occupational injuries and illnesses. Benefits include
medical insurance for covered workers and their families,98 maternity
care, day care for children, in addition to old age, retirement, and
survivor pensions. Coverage is compulsory for all workers and their
families. These programs are financed from contributions by workers,
employers, and the government.99 Worker contributions are based on
salary level, and workers earning the minimum wage are exempted. l00
Employers pay the largest contribution for most benefits and the entire
amount for the funds covering occupational hazards.' 0'
B. The United States
United States law provides far less substantive regulation of the
employment relationship than does Mexican law. Indeed, until the
1960s, U.S. employers essentially possessed an unlimited right to set the
terms and conditions of employment for nonunionized employees. Con-
gress, over the past twenty-five years, has enacted a number of statutes
95. Id. arts. 136, 150. Article 138 requires that the resources of the fund, known as Instituto del
Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores (INFONAVIT), be administered by a tripartite
body composed of representatives of labor, management, and the government. Unions-in particular
the CTM-have had considerable control over the management of INFONAVIT. Under new
regulations, however, INFONAVIT funds go directly into an individual employee account, lessening
union involvement. Foreign Labor Trends, supra note 11, at 15, 21.
96. See L.F.T. art. 137. Demand for housing, however, is much greater than the fund is able to
provide. For example, although INFONAVIT built over three million low- and medium-cost units
between 1972 and 1982, only two percent of those applying for housing in 1979 received it. See
GRAYSON, supra note 22, at 54; Garcia Peralta & Perlo Cohen, in 2 0BRERO MEXICANO, supra note
27, at 124.
97. For private-sector workers, the Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS) operates the social
secutrity system, and for public-sector employees, the Health and Social Security Institute for State
Employees (ISSTE) does. See NORA LUSTIG, MEXIco: THE REMAKING OF AN ECONOMY 83 (1992).
98. About 40% of the population is covered under IMSS, while ISSSTE covers another 10%.
PEMEX, the oil industry, and the military cover their employees separately. Thus a total of about 60%
of the population is covered under some form of employer-guaranteed health insurance. Id. at 84-85;
ANUARIO ESTADiSTICO, supra note 66, at 119. The rest of the population has access to free medical
care through clinics provided by the Ministry of Health. See LUSTIG, supra note 97, at 86.
99. See SCHLAGHECK, supra note 73, at 101.
100. Id.
101. See id. For the total premium ofIMSS medical expenses and old-age pensions, not including
worker's compensation, 12.5% is contributed by the federal government, 25% is deducted from
employee paychecks, and 62.5% is paid by employers. Id. See generally PRIMER, supra note 86, at 22.
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that now restrict the employer's prerogative. Nonetheless, U.S.
employers still possess considerably more latitude to manage the
workplace than do employers in most other industrialized nations.
1. Wage and Hour Regulation
The FLSA'0 2 establishes minimum wage and overtime pay
requirements. It mandates that employers pay covered employees a
minimum hourly wage that is currently $4.25 per hour' 03 -an amount
considerably higher than the minimum wage in Mexico. °4 The FLSA
also requires employers to compensate covered employees for work in
excess of forty hours per week at one and one-half times the employee's
regular rate of pay.0 5
2. Fringe Benefits
United States law generally does not mandate that employers
provide any minimum package of fringe benefits. In contrast to
Mexico, U.S. law does not require a minimum amount of vacation pay
or annual bonus and profit sharing payments. These topics are typically
either determined unilaterally by the employer or at the bargaining table.
The principal U.S. law relating to employee benefits is the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 116  ERISA
establishes procedural requirements with respect to the reporting,
disclosure, and fiduciary responsibilities of pension and employee
benefit plans. While ERISA contains detailed provisions governing the
funding and content of pension plans, it does not substantively regulate
the content of employee benefit plans. Instead, the principal impact of
ERISA on employment law matters is the act's broad preemptive
exclusion of state regulation.'0 7 As a result, employee benefit plans
in the United States are largely unregulated by either the federal or state
governments.
3. Discharge
The treatment of employment security highlights one of the starkest
contrasts between Mexican and U.S. legal rules. While Mexico's
102. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
103. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1988).
104. See supra note 66.
105. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1988).
106. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
107. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) ("[T]he provisions of[ERISA] shall supersede any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereinafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... ).
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constitution requires just cause for termination, 10 8 most U.S. employ-
ers remain free to discharge employees at-will.
As articulated by the Tennessee Supreme Court, the at-will rule
provides that "[a]ll may dismiss their employees at-will, be they many
or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for a cause morally wrong,
without being thereby guilty of legal wrong."'0 9 This highly individu-
alistic approach to the employment relationship grew out of nineteenth
century American notions of freedom of contract and unfettered
entrepreneurship." 0
In the twentieth century, the growing predominance of large
corporate employers and specialized job functions"' has triggered
criticism of the at-will rule's harshly lopsided impact on employees." 2
Reacting to this criticism, legislative and judicial bodies have created a
number of limitations on the at-will principle. The statutory limitations
primarily derive from antidiscrimination laws, while the judicial
limitations result from an extension of common law tort and contract
principles.
The principal federal antidiscrimination law was enacted as Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act."3 Title VII prohibits employers
and labor unions from discrimination in employment on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Congress extended the nondiscrimination principle in two subse-
108. See supra note 76.
109. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) (overruled on other grounds
by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915)).
110. See Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate
Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1824-26 (1980) ("[b]y increasing the employer's freedom
in the employment relationship and restricting her liability, the at will contract rule was meant to further
economic growth and entrepreneurship.").
111. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (II1. 1981) ("[w]ith
the rise of large corporations conducting specialized operations and employing relatively immobile
workers who often have no other place to market their skills, recognition that the employer and
employee do not stand on equal footing is realistic.").
112. One commentator, for example, has stated:
[i]n principal there is widespread agreement that the employment-at-will doctrine has no
economic or moral justification in a modem industrialized Nation. The idea that there is
equity in a rule under which the individual employee and the employer have the same right
to terminate an employment relationship at will is obviously fictional in a society in which
most workers are dependent upon employers for their livelihood.
Jack Steiber, Most U.S. Workers Still May be Fired Under the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, MONTHLY
LAB. REV., May 1984, at 34, 36; see also Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual
Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405
(1967); Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA.
L. REV. 481, 482-84 (1976).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
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quent acts. l"' Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,115
adopted in 1967, employees over the age of forty years are protected
from discrimination in hiring, discharge, and mandatory retirement. The
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,116 effective in 1991, prohib-
its employers from discriminating against an otherwise qualified
disabled person who, with or without reasonable accommodation, is
capable of performing essential job functions.
Two characteristics of these antidiscrimination statutes should be
noted. First, these statutes provide protection to individuals not as
workers per se, but as members of a particular group or class. Second,
employers are prohibited only from acting in a manner that discrimi-
nates on the basis of class status, even with respect to these protected
groups. Employer decisions that may be irrational or unfair are not
otherwise circumscribed by these statutes.
Over the past fifteen years, U.S. courts also have become less
tolerant of the traditional at-will rule. Courts, for example, are now
more receptive to adapting traditional tort and contract theories as a
basis for challenging employment decisions." 7  In addition, state
courts have recognized new causes of action in the employment context.
The three most commonly recognized new claims are discussed below.
Most jurisdictions now permit an employee to maintain a tort action
claiming that a discharge decision offends public policy.' Accord-
ingly, courts have held that public policy considerations bar employers
from terminating employees who refuse to commit an unlawful act, 19
who exercise statutory rights, 120 or who report an employer's unlawful
114. Antidiscrimination statutes also have been adopted on the state level. Many of these state
statutes go beyond federal law in terms of the classes protected. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 363.03 (1994)
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, marital status, and receipt of public
assistance in addition to the federally protected categories).
115. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
116. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1993).
117. See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 389 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn. 1986)
(authorizing defamation action for employees' foreseeable self-publication of employer's stated reasons
for discharge); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924-25 (Cal. App. 1981) (authorizing
contract action based upon alleged implied promise of employer not to terminate employee without
some type of cause).
118. See Michael A. Chagares, Utiliration of the Disclaimer as an Effective Means to Define the
Employment Relationship, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 365, 400-05 (1989) (citing 43 states as recognizing the
public policy cause of action).
119. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (refusal to participate
in an unlawful price-fixing scheme); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987)
(refusal to violate antipollution laws by dispensing leaded gas into car designed for unleaded gas).
120. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (reversing
summary judgment for employer on grounds that discharge for refusal to take polygraph test, in
contravention of state statute, may give rise to cause of action); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d




Most states also recognize a contract-based exception to the at-will
employment rule. 122  From an employer's unilateral promise, whether
expressed orally 123  or in an employee handbook, 124  these courts
imply contractual obligations, such as some form of job security or
disciplinary procedure.
A few jurisdictions go further and read a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing into employment agreements. 125  Such a covenant
requires that both parties within an employment relationship refrain
from acting in bad faith to frustrate the reciprocal net benefits of their
bargain.
While limitations on the at-will rule have proliferated, most U.S.
employees still work under an at-will status. 126  This is particularly
true for lower paid workers who have difficulty obtaining legal
representation because of the smaller potential for sizeable damage
awards.
127
The continued U.S. adherence to the at-will rule is now a global
anomaly. In contrast to Mexico and also the vast majority of industri-
alized nations, the U.S. system is unique in failing to adopt a general
prohibition on unjust dismissals. 28
121. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980) (employee
discharged for reporting labeling misrepresentations to employer); Palmateer v. International Harvester
Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (11. 1981) (employee discharged for reporting criminal conduct to authorities).
A number ofjurisdictions have enacted statutes specifically prohibiting employee discharges for such
"whistleblowing" activities. See, e.g., The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12,
103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201; 1212; 1214) (federal employees); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 15.361 et seq. (1992).
122. See Chagares, supra note 118, at 400-05 (citing 41 states as recognizing an implied contract
exception to the at-will rule).
123. See, e.g., Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983)
(finding representation that employee would not be discharged without cause within employment
contract); Bullock v. Automobile Club, 444 N.W.2d 114 (Mich. 1989) (holding revocation of oral
promise in policy manual not necessarily binding), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072, reh 'g denied, 494 U.S.
1092 (1990).
124. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985); see also Stephen
F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 326 (1992).
125. See, e.g., Mifford v. De Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983) (ruling against employer who
discharged employee in effort to avoid profit sharing liability); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d
1364 (Nev. 1987) (holding against employer who dismissed employee in effort to avoid retirement
benefit payments). Most states, however, have declined to recognize the covenant because of the
inherent difficulty in determining bad faith. See, e.g., Pamer v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625,
629 (Haw. 1982) (rejecting the covenant because it would necessitate "judicial incursions into the
amorphous concept of bad faith").
126. See supra note 58.
127. See JEROME CARLIN & JAN HOWARD, LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND CLASS JUSTICE 382-84;
Leon Mayhew & Albert Reiss, The Social Organization of Legal Contacts, 34 AM. SOC. REV. 309, 310-
311 (1969).
128. See Samuel Estreicher, Unjust Dismissals in Other Countries: Some Cautionary Notes, 10
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 286, 287 (1984); Summers, supra note 112, at 508-09.
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4. Workplace Safety and Health
OSHA 129 regulates workplace safety and health in the United
States. Similar to Mexican law, this U.S. Act authorizes the Secretary
of Labor to adopt workplace safety and health standards. Enforcement
procedures for these standards constitute the principal difference
between Mexican and U.S. law. While Mexico enforces safety and
health standards through a participatory system of labor-management
commissions, enforcement in the United States is accomplished by
means of workplace inspections with citations and accompanying
monetary penalties for noncompliance.
5. Housing
United States labor and employment law contains nothing which
resembles Mexico's housing mandate. United States employees are
generally responsible for taking care of their own housing needs without
assistance from their employers.
6. Social Security and Health Care
As in Mexico, labor and employment law in the United States
provides for assistance payments to injured 3 ' and retired' employ-
ees. Benefits in both countries are similarly funded. Employer
contributions are the sole source of worker's compensation benefits, 32
while both employers and employees contribute to the social security
retirement system.
133
Unlike Mexican employers, however, their U.S. counterparts are not
required to provide employees with either health care or day care
benefits. These significant omissions, which have been the subject of
much recent public debate, again underscore the more individualistic
and less regulated nature of U.S. law.
The U.S. employment law regime does provide one statutory
benefit that is not recognized in Mexico. The Family and Medical
129. See OSHA, supra note 81.
130. The worker's compensation system is regulated by state rather than federal law. The typical
state statute provides for the reimbursement of an employee's lost wages and medical expenses in the
event of a work-related injury or illness. These benefits are payable without regard to fault. See, e.g.,
Arthur Larson, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW 1-2 (1984).
131. The Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits Act, also known as the
Social Security Act, provides benefit payments to qualifying retired workers beginning at age 62. 42
U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1988). As an insurance-based program, an individual's eligibility and benefit level
are determined on the basis of his or her employment history. See id. § 414 (1988).
132. Larson, supra note 130, at 795-96.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1988).
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Leave Act 134 requires employers with fifty or more employees to
allow those workers to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in order
to care for a new child or a relative with a serious health condition.
The same rule applies where necessitated by the employee's own serious
health condition.
III. LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Both Mexican and U.S. law provide employees with basic rights to
organize, bargain collectively, and strike. Significant differences exist,
however, with respect to the extent and manner in which these rights are
protected. These contrasts expose strengths and weaknesses in both
systems.
A. Mexico
1. Right to Organize or Join a Union
Workers in Mexico may form a union without previous authoriza-
tion,"' and employees are not obligated either to join or to refrain
from joining a union.'36 The law allows the formation of trade,
company, industry-wide, and professional unions.'37
The union representation process in Mexico differs significantly
from that of the United States in terms of recognizing representational
rights without the necessity of first establishing majority support in an
election. United States employers are allowed to participate in the
election process by encouraging and sometimes intimidating employees
not to vote for union representation.13 The Mexican system does not
give employers the same opportunity to influence the organization
process.
In order to form a union in Mexico, a minimum of twenty workers
must agree to become members. Subsequently, they must establish
governing statutes, elect a governing body, and register with the
appropriate government authority. 139  Once these elements are satis-
fied, an employer must bargain with the union concerning the employ-
ment conditions of its members, regardless of whether the members
constitute a majority of the work force. 41
134. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1993).
135. L.F.T. art. 357.
136. Id. art. 358.
137. Id. art. 360. Workers also may form federations or confederations. See id arts. 381-385.
138. See infra notes 175-177 and accompanying text.
139. L.F.T. arts. 364, 365.
140. CLIMENT BELTRAN, supra note 18, at 268.
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A union must have majority support, however, in order to execute
a contract as the exclusive representative of all the employees in a
workplace.' 4' A union with majority status also may negotiate a
closed shop agreement that requires all new and current employees to
be members of that particular union. 4 2 An employer or an employee
may challenge the majority status of a union, at which point the labor
tribunal will monitor a bargaining unit-wide election to verify or refute
that status.'43
2. Collective Bargaining
An employer must enter into collective negotiations upon a union's
request to establish contractual terms."14  The resulting contract may
not diminish the minimum guarantees established by the constitution or
the L.F.T.,'45 and all contracts automatically incorporate these mini-
mum benefits and rights unless the parties agree upon greater bene-
fits.
146
Mexican labor law provides that a contract should include
provisions concerning hours and days of work, vacation, salary, training,
and contract administration. 47  Any contract that does not specify the
amount of compensation is void.
148
In addition to the typical collective bargaining agreement between
a single union and a single employer, in some circumstances the law
provides for an industry-wide contract known as a contrato-ley, or law
contract. 149  These contracts apply to industries under federal juris-
141. Id. at 274.
142. L.F.T. art. 395. United States law does not permit closed shop agreements. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1988). The NLRA authorizes only the more limited union shop arrangement, which
requires employees to contribute to the cost of union expenditures in performing its collective
bargaining and grievance adjustment duties. See Communication Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735
(1988).
143. L.F.T. arts. 923, 930; CLIMENT BELTRAN, supra note 18, at 274.
144. L.F.T. art. 387. If there is both a company union and an industrial union, then the employer
must negotiate with the organization that has the highest proportionate membership. If there are various
trade unions within the company, then the employer may negotiate separate contracts with each of them
according to the unions' preference. If a company has both trade unions and company or industry
unions, then the employer may bargain for a separate contract with the trade union provided that
union's membership exceeds the number of unit employees who belong to the company or industrial
unions. L.F.T. art. 388; see also CLIMENT BELTRAN, supra note 18, at 137.
145. L.F.T. art. 56; see also CLIMENT BELTRAN, supra note 18, at 272.
146. L.F.T. arts. 56-57.
147. Id. art. 391.
148. Id. art. 393. The terms of a collective bargaining agreement may be set for a specific or
indefinite length of time, or for a specific job. Id. art. 397. Contracts of at least two years' duration
or for an unspecified period will be subject to renegotiation every two years for working conditions and
every year for wages. Id. art. 399.
149. Id. arts. 404-421. See generally SECRETARIA DEL TRABAJO Y PREVISION SOCIAL/U.S. DEPT.
OF LABOR, A COMPARISON OF LABOR LAW IN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO: AN OVERVIEW 15-16
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diction.150 Unions representing at least two-thirds of the unionized
workers in a particular industry and a given area may ask the appropri-
ate administrative authority to establish negotiations on this broader
basis. 151 Where industry-wide bargaining is perceived as beneficial,
the authority will call a meeting of the affected unions and employers
in order to negotiate an industry-wide contract. 52 The majority of the
unions that represent at least two-thirds of the unionized workers and
the majority of their employers must approve such a contract.15 3
3. Right to Strike
Mexican law guarantees the right of employees to strike except
when a labor tribunal declares such action to be illegal.1 4  A labor
tribunal may find a strike to be illegal under the following four
circumstances: (1) where the union does not fulfill the notice or other
procedural requirements;' 55 (2) where the objective of the strike is not
one recognized by law as legitimate;'56 (3) where the strike is not
supported by a majority of the workers at that establishment;'57 and
(4) where a majority of the strikers participates in violence.5 8  Once
a labor tribunal has declared a strike illegal, workers must return to their
jobs within twenty-four hours or risk permanent replacement.'59
After a finding that a strike is legal, however, the company must
cease operations for the strike's duration.' 60 Only those employees
privy to confidential information and other essential employees, as
approved by the labor tribunal, may continue to work during a
strike. 6' In significant contrast to U.S. law, Mexican labor law
prohibits an employer from temporarily or permanently replacing legally
(1992) [hereinafter COMPARISON OF LABOR LAW].
150. L.F.T. art. 404.
151. Id. art. 406.
152. Id. arts. 409-412.
153. Id. art. 414. These industry-wide contracts assure that workers in the same industry receive
the same wages and benefits without regard to the company size. Although legal, such bargaining is
less common in the United States. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
154. MEx. CONST. art. 123, ch. XVII; L.F.T. art. 440.
155. A union must give at least six days' written notice to the employer of its intent to strike.
Notice must reveal the purpose and objective of the strike and the day it will commence. L.F.T. art.
920.
156. A strike's legality is upheld where its objectives are either to maintain the equilibrium between
labor and capital, to obtain a collective contract, to demand post-expiration contractual revisions, to
demand the fulfillment of the contract, to demand the distribution of profits, or to demand the revision
of contracted salaries if certain conditions are met. Id. art. 450.
157. Id. art. 459 (referring to arts. 451, 920).
158. Id. art. 445.
159. Id. art. 932.
160. Id. art. 447.
161. Id. arts. 935, 936.
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striking workers.
162
A strike may terminate by either an agreement between the parties,
an arbitral decision of a person or commission named by both parties,
or a decision of a labor tribunal if the conflict is submitted by the
strikers. 163  In order to avoid a more lengthy resolution in the tribu-
nals, agreements between the parties resolve most conflicts in Mexi-
co.
164
B. The United States
1. Right to Organize or to Join a Union
In the United States, the NLRA also protects the right of employ-
ees, at least in the private sector,165 to engage in organizational activi-
ties. 166 The NLRA specifically prohibits an employer from interfering
with an employee's right to join a union or from encouraging fellow
employees to join a union. 167  Accordingly, an employer commits an
unlawful labor practice by discharging an employee organizer 168 or
making threats of reprisal for union support.169
However, the NLRA's protection of organizational activity is
limited, 7 ° and a common characteristic of the U.S. legal labor regime
is strong employer opposition to union organizing efforts.171 This
opposition results, in part, from the election process used to establish
representational status in the United States. Unlike in Mexico, where
an employer must automatically bargain with a union concerning the
rights of its members, U.S. labor law imposes a duty to bargain only
162. Id. art. 447. Strikes are not causes justifying layoff. See id. art. 47.
163. Id. art. 469. A union may submit the conflict to a labor tribunal, but an employer may not.
The labor tribunal, in resolving the dispute, can set terms and conditions of employment. See E.
Alvarez del Castillo, Mexico, in 8 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 132 (R. Blanpain ed. 1982).
164. See del Castillo, supra note 163, at 129.
165. The NLRA does not apply in the public sector. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). Most states have
enacted statutes governing public sector labor relations. Some of these state statutes are very similar
to the NLRA in terms of the rights conferred upon employees, including the right to strike. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. §§ 179A.01-.20 (1994). Other statutes are more restrictive, and most prohibit public
employee strikes. See, e.g., D. WOLLETr ET AL., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
252 (4th ed. 1993).
166. 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (1995). The NLRA also protects an employee's right not to join a union
and to refrain from engaging in organizational activities. Id.
167. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1995).
168. See NLRB v. Transportation Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
169. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
170. The NLRA, for example, permits an employer to restrict employee organizing efforts to
nonworking time, see Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), and to ban the presence
of nonemployee organizers on its property altogether, see Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527
(1992).
171. See WEILER, supra note 46, at 111-14.
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after a union first establishes its majority status in a representation
election."i A union that receives majority support from the partici-
pants in a representation election'7 3 is certified as the exclusive
representative of all bargaining unit employees. 7 '
United States employers may participate actively in this election
process. Under the NLRA, an employer may express its opposition to
union organizing efforts so long as it does not engage in threats of
reprisal for union support or make promises of benefits to entice union
opposition.' For example, an employer may argue that a union is
unnecessary, or he may predict that unfavorable consequences will likely
result from a union election victory. 176 Legally, the employer may
make misstatements of fact and intentionally lie.' 77
Many employers hire professional consultants for the purpose of
orchestrating sophisticated antiunion campaigns. Frequently, employer
"union free" campaigns 78 also include illegal tactics, such as firing
employee organizers. Although the NLRA bans these tactics, it subjects
the employer to relatively weak sanctions.17 9
2. Collective Bargaining
The NLRA also confers the right of employees to bargain
collectively through their selected union representative.' 80 Mandatory
subjects of bargaining include wages, hours, and terms and conditions
of employment,' 8' but not matters that go to the core of an employer's
entrepreneurial control,8 2  such as plant closings8 3  and product
172. A union may also gain representational status through an employer's voluntary grant of
recognition, but an employer lawfully may decline to do so, even if presented with authorization cards
signed by a majority of the employees. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S.
301 (1974).
173. Employees in the United States are entitled to proceed with a representation election only if
they can show support from at least 30 percent of the employees in an appropriate election unit. See
29 C.F.R. §101.18(aX3) (1995).
174. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1995).
175. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(c).
176. See NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1967).
177. See Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
178. For a discussion of both the legal and illegal tactics used by U.S. employers in opposing union
organizing efforts, see Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organi:ation
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1776-81 (1983).
179. The ineffectiveness of NLRA remedies with respect to the discharge of employee organizers
is discussed infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
180. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1995).
181. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1995). See also NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356
U.S. 342 (1958).
182. See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (stating that the NLRA does not require bargaining with regard to managerial decisions
"which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control").
1996]
294 COMPARATIVE LABOR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:269
advertising.184
The collective bargaining process in the United States differs from
that of Mexico in two respects. First, the collective bargaining process
established by the NLRA is more adversarial and less participatory than
that which exists in Mexico."' Both labor and management, for
example, may resort to economic weapons to pressure the bargaining
process even before a breakdown in negotiations. 6  Furthermore,
both courts and the NLRB have interpreted the NLRA as prohibiting
employers from establishing participatory employee-management
committees for the purpose of dealing with terms and conditions of
employment.
187
Second, collective bargaining in the United States is most often
conducted at the individual employer level rather than on an industry-
wide basis, such as that leading to the Mexican contrato-ley. Collective
bargaining that involves more than one employer is permitted in the
United States, but only if all participants voluntarily agree to such an
arrangement.'88 Nonetheless, even multi-employer bargaining-which
typically is not structured on an industry-wide basis-is the exception
rather than the norm. 189  This lack of industry-wide bargaining has
helped put the United States "at the top of the developed world in wage
inequality."' 90
183. See, e.g., First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (holding that an employer
is not required to bargain with respect to a decision to close part of its business operation).
184. See, e.g., NLRB v. Detroit Resilient Floor Decorators Local 2265, 317 F.2d 269 (6th Cir.
1963) (holding that an employer is not required to bargain with respect to deciding whether to
contribute to an industry promotion fund).
185. See generally WEILER, supra note 46, at 232; Thomas Kohler, Models of Worker Participa-
tion: The Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REV. 499 (1986).
186. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) (finding that a union does
not violate its duty to bargain by engaging in lawful but unprotected work stoppage prior to reaching
an impasse in bargaining); Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding that an employer
does not violate its duty to bargain by engaging in a lockout prior to reaching an impasse in bargaining
absent evidence of antiunion animus).
187. See NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959); Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990
(1992). To the extent these committees are created unilaterally by an employer, they are construed as
"dominated" by an employer in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(aX2) and an impediment to free collective
bargaining through a representative of the employees' own choosing. See NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co.,
217 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1954).
188. See Kroger Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 569 (1964).
189. Department of Labor statistics indicate that 42% of collective bargaining agreements covering
1000 or more employees in 1978 were negotiated on a multi-employer basis. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Bull. No. 2065, CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS-JAN. 1, 1978 12 tbl. 1.8 (1980).
190. Kaufman & Kleiner, supra note 31, at 44.
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3. The Right to Strike
The NLRA protects the right of employees to engage in "concerted
activity for mutual aid or protection."' 9' This includes a ban on an
employer's ability to discharge 92 or otherwise retaliate against an
employee who participates in a lawful strike.' 93
In sharp contrast to Mexican law, a U.S. employer may hire either
temporary or permanent replacement workers to fill the positions
vacated by those engaged in a lawful strike. 94 A temporary replace-
ment is a worker whom an employer hires during a strike and then sup-
plants with a returning striker. However, an employer may retain the
services of a permanent replacement for an indefinite period. The
strikers whose positions are filled by permanent replacements are placed
on a waiting list and entitled to return to work only as their former
positions become available.' 95
United States law also is more restrictive with respect to a union's
ability to choose between arbitration and economic action in attempting
to resolve workplace disputes. In the face of either breach of contract
or collective bargaining disputes,' 96 Mexican law generally permits
unions to choose between going on strike or submitting the dispute to
a labor tribunal for binding resolution.' 97 United States law usually
provides only one option in either circumstance. It generally bans
strikes when a union may challenge contract interpretation in grievance
arbitration,' but it authorizes strikes, although not mandatory arbitra-
191. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1995). See also 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1995) ("[n]othing in this Act, shall be
construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike").
192. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3); NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 700 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1983).
193. See, e.g., NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967) (holding that an employer
committed an unfair labor practice by paying accrued vacation benefits to all qualifying employees
except those who participated in a lawful strike).
194. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (holding that the NLRA does
not deprive an employer of "the right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left
vacant by strikers"). An employer, however, may not hire permanent replacements to fill the positions
of employees who are on strike to protest the unfair labor practices committed by the employer. See,
e.g., Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
195. See Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366
(1968).
196. See supra note 156.
197. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
198. An estimated 96% of all U.S. collective bargaining agreements provide for arbitration of
disputes concerning interpretation or application of the agreement's terms. Approximately 90% of these
agreements also contain a waiver of the union's right to strike during the contract term. FRANK
ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 6 (4th ed. 1985). Unless the agreement
clearly specifies otherwise, it is presumed that the availability of grievance arbitration waives the
union's right to strike in response to the alleged breach of contract. Local 174, Int'l Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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tion, in the event of a bargaining stalemate.'99
IV ENFORCEMENT
A. Mexico
Mexican labor law establishes various administrative and judicial
institutions for labor dispute resolution. These bodies address both
collective and individual disputes and are structured to facilitate
voluntary resolution.
1. Workplace Commissions
At the most basic level, Mexican law requires that each workplace
establish joint labor-management commissions to determine the
distribution of profit sharing bonuses °° and to monitor occupational
safety and health concerns.2"' Labor contracts may delegate additional
tasks to these commissions and empower them to render binding
decisions.20 2
2. Conciliation Tribunals
If the parties fail to resolve the dispute among themselves or at the
commission level, the next step is a hearing before the appropriate
conciliation tribunal. These tribunals consist of representatives from
labor, management, and the government.20 3 Conciliation tribunals
facilitate discussion and settlement, but they cannot impose a resolution.
A party may bring a dispute before the appropriate judicial body if the
conciliation process fails to achieve a voluntary resolution.
3. Judicial Institutions
The Tribunals of Conciliation and Arbitration ("labor tribunals")
have jurisdiction over all labor disputes. 2 4  They consist of an equal
number of labor and management members, and a government
199. Binding interest arbitration to establish the terms of a collective bargaining agreement is
available only if the parties agree. It is an unfair labor practice for a party to insist upon acceptance
of the interest arbitration alternative to the point of impasse. See Columbus Printing Pressman, 219
N.L.R.B. 268, enforced, 543 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1976).
200. L.F.T. art. 125.
201. Id. art. 509.
202. Id. art. 392. Workplace commissions, however, may not usurp the jurisdiction of labor
tribunals in resolving conflicts between labor and management. CLIMENT BELTRAN, supra note 18, at
281.
203. L.F.T. arts. 591-603.
204. Del Castillo, supra note 163, at 88.
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representative chairs them. 205 Labor tribunal decisions are final and
unappealable. However, a court of general jurisdiction may review a
tribunal decision if a party brings an action to enjoin the decision.20 6
These tribunals resolve both individual and collective conflicts.
Individual complaints primarily involve contested dismissals. 2 7
Collective disputes frequently concern contract negotiations or contract
enforcement.20 8 In addition, the tribunals have the authority to
determine the legality of strikes 209 and, upon a union's request, to
arbitrate bargaining disputes.
This enforcement scheme again illustrates the protective nature of
Mexican labor law towards workers. In judicial proceedings, for
example, Mexican law instructs the tribunals to decide any ambiguity
in the substantive law in favor of the worker.2  Mexican law also es-
tablishes an administrative body, the Procurator for the Defense of
Labor,212 to represent employee interests free of charge in dispute
resolution proceedings. Finally, the Mexican system provides workers
with certain procedural advantages in individual disputes brought before
a labor tribunal. 3
B. The United States
The U.S. enforcement scheme differs from Mexico's in two
principal respects. First, the U.S. model is more combative and less
205. MEX. CONST. art. 123, ch. XX; L.F.T. art. 605; COMPARISON OF LABOR LAW, supra note
149, at 24. The labor and management representatives are elected every six years, during conventions
to which unions and nonunionized workers send delegates. L.F.T. art. 648. The tribunals generally
are permanent bodies, although special ad hoc boards may be formed in order to address specific
conflicts. Id. art. 892. The Mexico City-based Federal Tribunal also has local offices in the state
capitals and other cities to process individual claims. Collective disputes under federal jurisdiction must
be brought before the Mexico City tribunal. Id. art. 622. COMPARISON OF LABOR LAW, supra note
149, at 25.
206. L.F.T. art 848. For a discussion of the use of the injunction, or amparo in Mexican law, see
CLIMENT BELTRAN, supra note 18, at 511-19.
207. See ROXBOROUGH, supra note 21, at 147. For example, a tribunal has the authority to deter-
mine whether a dismissal was for good cause and if not, to order either reinstatement or severance pay
equal to three months' wages. L.F.T. arts. 48-49.
208. L.F.T. art. 450, chs. II, IV.
209. Id. art. 929.
210. Id. art. 450, ch. II. See also INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, supra note 163, at 110.
211. CLIMENT BELTRAN, supra note 18, at 38.
212. The purpose of the Procurator for the Defense of Labor is to represent workers and unions
on questions about the application of labor norms; to provide resources for the defense of workers or
unions; to act as mediator for interested parties; and, if requested, to provide free representation of the
worker in a labor dispute. L.F.T. arts. 530, 534.
213. For instance, the court itself will supplement a worker's claim that is inadequately presented,
or provide a worker with a three-day period in which to supply any additional necessary information.
Id. art. 873; see also id. art. 879 (effect of nonappearance at hearing is admission of guilt for employer,
but not for employee); id. art. 824 (allowing tribunal to appoint expert witnesses for employees).
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participatory. The government's role in the process most vividly
illustrates this attitude; it acts not as a mediator, but "as the umpire in
[a] protracted contest.,' 214 Second, the U.S. system described below
uses separate enforcement mechanisms for collective and individual
rights.
1. Collective Rights
Collective rights in the United States generally are enforced in
nonjudicial forums. Different forums exist for rights arising from
statute as distinguished from rights arising from labor contracts.
Collective rights arising under the NLRA are enforced through
administrative procedures. The NLRA prohibits various "unfair labor
practices" committed by either employers215  or labor unions.
216
Administratively, the NLRA establishes a National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) with two distinct functions. One branch of the NLRB,
under the direction of the NLRB's General Counsel, investigates and
prosecutes unfair labor practice proceedings on behalf of complaining
unions, employees, or employers.217 Independently, the NLRB, as a
five-member, quasi-judicial body, reviews the unfair labor practice
decisions of administrative law judges. 18  NLRB decisions, in turn,
are subject to further review by the federal appellate courts." 9
Arbitration usually enforces rights created by the provisions of
collective bargaining agreements. The vast majority of such agreements
negotiated under the NLRA provide for a "just cause" limitation on em-
ployee discipline, and a grievance procedure culminating in binding
arbitration for disputes arising during the contract term.22° Typically,
labor and management jointly select a neutral arbitrator from a list of
private arbitrators maintained by a federal or state agency. These
arbitration decisions are subject to very limited judicial review.22'
Therefore, commentators generally view arbitration as less formal, less
expensive, and more expeditious than litigation.222
214. WEILER, supra note 46, at 232.
215. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1995).
216. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1995).
217. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1995).
218. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153(a), 160(c) (1995).
219. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1995).
220. See Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Employee
Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594, 594 n.1 (noting that ninety-four percent of collective bargaining
agreements entered into under the NLRA contain clauses that provide that an employer may discharge
employees only with "just cause").
221. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
222. See, e.g., ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 198, at 7-9; Roger 1. Abrams, The Integrity of the
Arbitral Process, 76 MICH. L. REv. 231, 236-37 (1977).
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2. Individual Rights
Individual rights, such as those arising under antidiscrimination
statutes, 223 and common law limitations to the at-will rule, are en-
forced through private litigation in courts of general jurisdiction.
Individual litigants generally pursue these claims without union
involvement.224
This private enforcement approach has all of the attendant
advantages and disadvantages of traditional litigation. For example,
litigation may be preferable to other methods of enforcement because
the inherent, significant due process guarantees allow an individual
greater freedom to control her own fate. On the other hand, litigation
is expensive, adversarial, and slow. Individual employees may not
possess the financial resources necessary to fund a private lawsuit.225
Therefore, the U.S. system both deters and delays the pursuit of
individual employee claims. Further, courts of general jurisdiction, in
contrast to Mexico's labor tribunals, may lack expertise in the substance
of the laws regulating the workplace.226
A significant effect of this bifurcated enforcement system is the
absence of U.S. unions in the enforcement of individual rights. Unlike
in Mexico, 227 U.S. collective bargaining agreements do not automati-
cally incorporate substantive rights established by statute. Instead,
individual statutory rights in the United States both arise and are
enforced separately from the labor-management system. This separation
not only gives unions less control over the employment relationship, but
it also makes unions less necessary to workers who may enforce these
rights on their own.
223. An individual aggrieved under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e (1995), must initially file a claim
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the administrative agency charged with
enforcing Title VII, or a similar state agency. The EEOC has authority to bring suits on behalf of
claimants, but more typically issues "right to sue letters" authorizing individual claimants to initiate suits
in federal court on their own behalf. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f) (1995).
224. The enforcement of safety and health standards under the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
29 U.S.C. §651 et seq. (1995), represents an exception to the litigation model. The OSH Act authorizes
the Secretary of Labor to promulgate rules that mandate certain health and safety standards. 29 U.S.C.
§ 655 (1995). The Secretary then enforces these standards through workplace inspections and monetary
penalties for noncompliance. 29 U.S.C. § 657-59 (1995). Employers may contest citations for
noncompliance in an administrative proceeding. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1995).
225. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
226. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 198, at 7-9 (specialized labor tribunals and arbitrators
possess a greater familiarity with the needs and techniques of industrial relations).
227. See, e.g., L.F.T. art. 393.
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V EFFECTIVENESS
A. Mexico
Mexico's legal and political system differs significantly from that
of the United States. In fact, the Mexican system has more in common
with the European civil law system than with the United States common
law system. As this comparison has illustrated, (1) Mexico is a civil
law nation with a greater emphasis on constitutional and statutory
regulation; (2) Mexican law promotes a more cooperative approach to
resolving labor and employment disputes; (3) the Mexican government
plays a more active role in establishing labor policy and in facilitating
dispute resolution; and (4) labor participates directly in the government
and is more politically powerful in both relative numbers and influence
than in the United States. These differences are real, but one must be
careful not to equate difference with either inferiority or superiority.
The negative image created by U.S. commentators during the
NAFTA treaty debate overstated the failings of the Mexican labor law
system. Indeed, as this comparison of U.S. and Mexican law has
illustrated, the Mexican system is more protective of worker rights than
its U.S. counterpart. Labor union density in Mexico is more than
double that in the United States, 228 and the labor sector of the PRI is
an effective voice for workers in the government.
Nevertheless, the Mexican labor relations system has failed to
protect workers to the full extent that it should. Significant problems
do exist in the Mexican workplace. These problems, however, are not
primarily due to defects in the substance of Mexican labor law, but
rather they are reflections of limited resources and a scarcity of jobs.
Three of the more accurate and tangible criticisms raised by the
commentators-low wages, enforcement problems in occupational health
and safety regulations, and union leadership accountability and state
control-are discussed below. However, even with respect to these
subjects, the critics inflate the shortcomings of the Mexican system.
1. Low Wages
Critics contend that low wages send U.S. jobs to Mexico.
Industrial wages in Mexico are about one-sixth of those in the United
228. Approximately 25-30% of Mexico's private sector work force is unionized, as compared to
11.5% in the United States. See supra notes 11, 55.
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States.229 But the cause of this discrepancy is not, as some critics
suggest, the inadequacy of Mexican labor law or a deliberate govern-
ment policy to keep wages low in order to attract foreign invest-
ment.230 The real problem with wages is simply that Mexico remains
a relatively poor country as compared to the United States. Wage rates
in Mexico over the past forty years mirror those in many other develop-
ing countries. As in those countries, chronic unemployment and
underemployment result in a plentiful labor supply that serves to keep
wages low.
231
Unlike many other developing countries, Mexico enjoyed a positive
and steady gross domestic product growth rate from the 1950s into the
1970s;232 real wages23 3 also grew steadily throughout this peri-
od.2 34  The government regularly made minimum wage adjustments
to raise wage rates, increase labor support for the PRI, and promote
union growth. 235  Only in the mid-1970s, when inflation began to
climb dangerously, did the government negotiate wage ceilings with
labor.
236
During the 1980s, Mexico's economic crisis deepened consider-
ably.23 7 Mexico had a negative economic growth rate in 1982, 1983,
and 1986, and inflation reached a peak of 159% in 1987.238 In that
year, the Mexican government negotiated an Economic Solidarity Pact
with representatives of labor, agriculture and business. The pact cut
government spending and asked for sacrifices from both labor and busi-
ness by imposing a wage and price freeze.239
Real wages dropped during the 1980s by 40-50% primarily due to
inflation and the wage freeze. 40 Mexico, however, was not alone in
experiencing this pattern of declining compensation. Since 1980, the
229. Geri Smith, Congratulations, Mexico, You're Due for a Raise, BUS. WK., Sept. 27, 1993, at
58.
230. Id. See also supra note 9.
231. See supra note 43.
232. See SCHLAGHECK, supra note 73, at 40-41.
233. Real wages refer to actual wages paid, adjusted for inflation.
234. See ROXBOROUGH, supra note 21, at 27.
235. See SCHLAGHECK, supra note 73, at 146. In addition, some administrations used their
influence to back unions' demands for higher wages in collective bargaining disputes. Id. at 138-39.
Schlagheck quotes from a Business International Corporation publication stating that in 1973 and 1974,
the Echeverria administration averted national strikes by encouraging companies to accept unions' wage
demands. Business International Corp., Mexico, in INVESTING, LICENSING, AND TRADE CONDITIONS
ABROAD 21 (1975).
236. See Ian Roxborough & Ilan Bizberg, Union Locals in Mexico: the "New Unionism" in Steel
and Automobiles, 15 J. LAT. AM. STUD. 117, 118 (1983).
237. See generally LusnG, supra note 97.
238. Id. at 40-41.
239. Foreign Labor Trends, supra note 11, at 14.
240. Id.
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United States also has experienced a significant decrease in wages, after
adjusting for inflation.24'
Mexico's economic fortunes started to turn around in the 1990s.
Mexico had a balanced budget by 1992,242 and in 1994, inflation was
steady at 7.1%.243 As the economy improved, so did wages, which
in real terms rose about 129% between 1987 and 1992, just ahead of the
average national productivity growth.244  In addition, the many
benefits mandated by Mexican law can add about 60% to the total
compensation package received by Mexican workers.245
2. Enforcement of Occupational Safety and Health Regulations
Critics claim that the Mexican government turns a blind eye to
safety and health violations so as not to discourage foreign invest-
ment.246 A lack of resources for better monitoring and the failure to
develop fully the system of workplace safety and health commissions,
however, may offer a better explanation of Mexico's shortcomings in
this area.247
Mexico has one safety and health inspector for every 750 work-
places. 248  Although 37,000 inspections were conducted in 1990, few
241. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., 1994 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.
427, tbl. 661 (depicting a 7% decline in average weekly earnings for private sector employees from
1980 to 1993, after adjusting for inflation).
242. Foreign Labor Trends, supra note 11, at 3.
243. See U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, 5 DISPATCH SUPPLEMENT, U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission
Meeting Mexico City May 8-9, 1994, at 13 (Supp. No. 3, May 1994) [hereinafter DISPATCH].
244. See id. at 15. Minimum wage increases continue to be lower than the inflation rate. See
Foreign Labor Trends, supra note 11, at 7. Less than 15% of the labor force, largely unorganized,
earns as little as the minimum wage, however. Id. Contract wage increases, on the other hand, have
exceeded inflation. Id. at 17. In 1990, almost 80% of industrial workers earned more than the
minimum wage, and 18% of those earned three or more times the minimum wage. See ANUARIO
ESTADISTICO, supra note 66, at 90.
Sadly, the sudden devaluation of the peso in December 1994 has put the entire recovery in
jeopardy. It remains to be seen whether Mexican workers will be willing to moderate their demands
again through yet another recovery.
245. SCHLAGHECK, supra note 73, at 102. Also, the proportion of the population receiving benefits
increased considerably in the last several decades. In 1970, social security covered 12.2 million people.
In 1982, it covered 40 million. See Goldin, supra note 9, at 221 n.93 (citing Barry Carr, The Mexican
Economic Debacle and the Labor Movement: A New Era or More of the Same? in MODERN MEXICO:
STATE, ECONOMY, AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS 205 (N. Hamilton & T. Harding eds. 1986)).
246. See sources cited supra note 9. See also Beatriz Johnston Hernindez, Incapacidad en Mdxico
para controlar la contaminaci6n de las maquiladoras, PROCESO, Sept. 14, 1992, at 19.
247. According to the 1992 World Labour Report, problems with safety and health regulations are
common throughout the developing world. "Many governments," says the report, "are aware of these
[enforcement] problems, but they may not have the resources to tackle them." According to the report,
however, Mexico is taking action by establishing "new mechanisms and organisations to improve safety
and increase the awareness of local people." INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, 5 WORLD
LABOUR REPORT 81 (1992).
248. COMPARISON OF OSH, supra note 81, at II-10.
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facilities are inspected on even an annual basis. 24 9  In the United
States, however, the statistics are even worse. The United States has
only one inspector for every 2,600 worksites; only 10,000 to 15,000 of
30,000 annual complaints of hazardous workplace conditions are
investigated.25 °
According to International Labour Organisation statistics, Mexico's
occupational safety and health record is comparable to Colombia's, but
better than Brazil's or South Korea's.251 The overall U.S. occupation-
al safety and health record is better than Mexico's, but work-related
death rates in the United States are still 3.5 times those of Japan and 5.8
times those of Sweden.252 These figures suggest that while Mexico
searches for ways in which to improve its record, it may not want to
look to the U.S. model. The European and Japanese systems which,
like Mexico's, rely more on labor-management commissions for en-
forcement, generally are considered more effective and efficient than
"inspectorate or civil liability schemes" such as those used in the United
States. 2
53
In Europe and Japan, the workplace commissions actually have the
legal power to monitor and, to some degree, to enforce compliance with
regulations.254 In Mexico, the commissions keep records, monitor
enforcement, and make recommendations, but they do not have the
power to enforce their decisions.255 Perhaps the most effective and
cost-efficient method of improving Mexico's health and safety record
is not to adopt a costly U.S.-style inspection scheme, but rather to give
enforcement powers to the already-existing workplace commissions.
3. Union Leadership Accountability and State Control
A criticism often voiced during the NAFTA debate was that
Mexican unions are "passive instruments of the state ... used to keep
wages down in the service of capital accumulation and accelerated
249. Id.
250. Id. at II-10 to 11-11.
251. The rate of fatal injuries per 1,000 workers exposed to risk in Mexico in 1991 was 0.14, and
in Colombia in 1990 it was 0.132. In 1991 Brazil's rate was 0.200, and the Republic of Korea's was
0.290. The U.S. rate is measured per 1,000,000 hours worked and includes occupational diseases. In
1991 it was 0.021. 52 [1993] Y.B. OF LAB. STAT. (Int'l Lab. Org.) 1094, 1095, 1097, 1100.
252. Freeman & Rogers, supra note 31, at 23.
253. See, e.g., id. at 23-24.
254. Id. at 23.
255. Either party, however, may bring a complaint before the labor tribunal, whose decision would
be binding. LABOUR CANADA, COMPARISON OF LABOUR LEGISLATION OF GENERAL APPLICATION IN
CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO 18 (March 1991) [hereinafter LABOUR CANADA COMPAR-
ISON].
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economic growth." '256 Critics describe a series of government prac-
tices that allegedly dampen the real power of labor in Mexico. For
example, commentators point to a system of state patronage for key
union leaders that results in a highly centralized, unresponsive system
of internal union governance. 7  They also contend that government
manipulation258  and the operation of closed shop agreements 259
repress labor militancy 260 and impede the development of unions that
are independent of government control. Finally, they assert that the
labor tribunals generally rule in favor of management.26' The net
result, according to these critics, is that Mexican workers have "little or




These characterizations bear some truth and reveal problems in the
Mexican labor relations system. The critics, however, have significantly
overstated the extent of these problems. Empirical studies contradict
many of the critics' claims and portray a system characterized by
261considerable militancy, autonomy, and direct worker participation.
The government-affiliated unions-the most influential being Fidel
Veldzquez's CTM-have the advantage of access to government
officials and resources. This access is both beneficial and harmful to
workers' interests. The "official" labor sector's influence on the
government is largely responsible for the substantial and growing
benefits available to members of these unions and Mexican workers in
general.2 4 On the other hand, this close association also enables the
state to moderate labor demands.265
State control of labor relations in Mexico is far from absolute,
however. In spite of a long period of overall labor peace, Mexico has
256. ROXBOROUGH, supra note 21 , at 5.
257. See Bensustn & Garcia, Introducci6n, in MODERNIDAD Y LEGISLACI6N LABORAL, supra note
24, at 11-12; Juan Felipe Leal & Josd Woldenberg, El sindicalismo mexicano, aspectos organizativos,
in 7 CUADERNOS POLITICOS 44, 47 (Jan.-Mar. 1976).
258. For example, critics claim that the labor courts manipulate registration requirements in order
to refuse to register unions not affiliated with the PR!. HECTOR SANTOS AZUELA, ESTUDIOS DE
DERECHO SINDICAL Y DEL TRABAJO 175-81 (1987); Nugent, supra note 9, at 213.
259. Ifa labor contract has a closed shop exclusion clause, any employee who tries to form a union
other than the exclusive representative may be expelled from the latter union and automatically
discharged. L.F.T. art. 395.
260. Goldin, supra note 9, at 4-6.
261. Management especially displays such favoritism by recognizing less radical unions as
representatives of the majority and declaring strikes illegal. See SANTOS AZUELA, supra note 258, at
170-70, 174-75; Octavio L6yzaga de ]a Cueva, Libertadsindicaly derecho de huelga, in MODERNIDAD
Y LEGISLACI6N LABORAL, supra note 24, at 68, 73-74.
262. Peters, supra note 9, at 1.
263. See generally ROXBOROUGH, supra note 21.
264. See Goldin, supra note 9, at 221.
265. Many commentators cite the Solidarity Pacts as an example. See supra note 239 and accompa-
nying text.
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a long tradition of labor insurgency. Particularly in the national
industrial unions, there has been a continual struggle between rank and
file militants and the more conservative leadership.
2 66
Moreover, the CTM is not the sole voice of the Mexican labor
movement. Several major labor organizations other than the CTM are
affiliated with the PRI.26 7 In addition, numerous "independent"
unions exist, some having ties to the PRI and others being completely
unassociated.268
A study of the Mexican auto industry conducted in the late 1970s
and early 1980s illustrates the existence of "independent" unions and
internal rank and file participation in union decision making.269 Six
government-affiliated and three "independent" unions represented auto
workers at that time. While some findings of the study suggested that
the "independent" unions were more effective in pursuing worker
demands, other findings indicated otherwise. The studies found two of
the "official" unions to be just as "militant" as the "independent" ones,
and the size of wage increases not to correlate with either the "indepen-
dent" or "official" union groups.27 °
This study also contradicts the asserted lack of internal union
democracy in Mexico. The study's author, after reviewing his findings,
concluded that
266. See ROXBOROUGH, supra note 21, at 35. For example, during the 1970s workers within
several industries struggled against the established labor bureaucracy. For a discussion of this period
of labor insurgency, see RAFAEL CORDERA CAMPOS, SINDICALISMO EN MOVIMIENTO: DE LA
INSURGENCIA A LA NACION (1988); SILVIA GOMEZ TAGLE, INSURGENCIA Y DEMOCRACIA EN LOS
SrNDICATOS ELECTRICISTAS (1980); ANGELICA CU LLAR VAZQUEZ, UNA REBELION DEPENDIENTE: LA
TENDENCIA DEMOCRATICA FRENTE AL ESTADO MEXICANO (1986).
267. Those under the umbrella organization, Congreso de Trabajo (CT), include the Federaci6n
de Sindicatos de Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado (FSTSE), the major state workers union; the
Confederaci6n Revolucionara de Obreros y Campesinos (CROC), a confederation of workers and
peasants; the Confederaci6n Regional Obrera Mxicana (CROM); the Confederaci6n de Trabajadores
y Campesinos (CTC); the Confederaci6n Obrera Revolucionara (COR); and the Confederaci6n General
de Trabajadores (CGT). See GRAYSON, supra note 22, at 24-33; Foreign Labor Trends, supra note
11, at 7-10.
268. The major unions which affiliated with the PRI, but which maintained leadership significantly
independent from CTM influence, include the unions of electrical workers (SUTERM), railroad workers
(STFRM), telephone workers (STRM), miners (SITMMSRM), transport workers (STSTC), and
education workers (SNTE). Juan Felipe Leal, Las estructuras sindicales, in 3 EL OBRERO MEX]CANO:
ORGANIZACION Y SINDICALISMO, supra note 31, at 9, 56-57; see also GRAYSON, supra note 22, at 36.
Those unions that are not members of CT include the umbrella group of the Unidad Obrera
Independiente (UOI), two University worker unions (STUNAM and SUNTU), and the Frente Aulntico
de Trabajadores (FAT). See Leal, supra, at 53; GRAYSON, supra note 22, at 39.
269. See generally ROXBOROUGH, supra note 21.
270. The authors measured strike propensity, labor control over work processes, and independence
with respect to the government-affiliated unions. Two of the "official" unions were among the five
showing the greatest strike frequency. The same five showed the greatest control over work processes
as well. See Roxborough & Bizberg, supra note 236, at 127-29.
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[u]nions which resemble the picture of charrismo [government-manipu-
lated entities] clearly do exist. But, at least in the automobile industry,
this is by no means the entire picture. There is clear and unambiguous
evidence that several unions in the Mexican auto industry are character-
ized by lively and meaningful internal democracy271
Another study comparing worker participation in union affairs in
several countries reached a similar conclusion.272 This study measured
the extent of union democracy by analyzing such factors as the number
of contested union officer elections, the closeness of such elections, the
turnover of union leaders, and the existence of a permanent and
organized opposition to current union leadership. Based on these
considerations, the study concluded that Mexican unions, including the
"official" ones, 2 73 have a higher level of internal democracy than their
counterparts in Great Britain and the United States.274
Finally, statistical evidence also undercuts the claim that labor
tribunals consistently favor management. One empirical analysis of
labor tribunal decisions found that roughly one-third favors workers,
one-third favors management, and the remaining one-third has a mixed
resolution.2 75  Further, while labor tribunals sometimes have sided
with less militant, government-associated unions in deciding contested
elections, they also have certified nongovernment-affiliated unions as
election winners.276
271. ROXBOROUGH, supra note 21, at 143.
272. Mark Thompson & Ian Roxborough, Union Elections and Democracy in Mexico: A Compara-
tive Perspective, 20 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 201 (1982).
273. The "independent" unions generally, although not universally, appear to be more responsive
to the rank and file than official unions are. See id. at 213. However, nongovernment-affiliated unions
are not always less hierarchical and more democratic than the "official" unions. See ROxBOROUGH,
supra note 21, at 141-43. See generally ROXBOROUGH, supra note 21, at 132-44.
274. See Thompson & Roxborough, supra note 272, at 213. In the United States, the Labor-Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988), establishes procedures
for union elections and imposes fiduciary responsibilities on union officers. Despite the LMRDA's goal
of enhancing internal union democracy, an objective expressed by § 401, significant problems persist.
Union leadership is often bureaucratic and unresponsive to membership concerns. See, e.g., Roger
Hartley, The Framework of Democracy in Union Government, 32 CATH. U. L. REv. 13, 65-66 (1982);
Note, Union Elections and the LMRDA: Thirteen Years of Use and Abuse, 81 YALE L.J. 407, 417-21
(1972). Incumbent union leaders discourage challengers by using the powers of office to reward loyal
adherents and control the channels ofcommunication. Hartley, supra, at 74-76; Union Elections, supra,
at 448-61. The practice of electing officers, not by direct membership vote, but indirectly by delegates
at conventions, further entrenches incumbency at the national and international levels. See WILLIAM
GOULD, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 176
(1993).
275. See ANUARIO ESTADiSTICO, supra note 66, at 82.
276. See Thompson & Roxborough, supra note 272, at 212, 214. Significantly, unions and
workers continue to bring representation disputes before the tribunals, behavior which suggests a belief
that such claims can be successful or at least fairly heard. Id. at 212. For example, in 1993 the Levi
Strauss Company surreptitiously closed down a plant which it had operated in Ciudad Juarez for twenty
years, and it hauled off as much merchandise and machinery as could be loaded overnight. Workers
knew nothing in advance of the closure, and the company did not pay them either outstanding
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B. The United States
The U.S. system also has a mixed record in effectively protecting
worker rights. The labor and employment law landscape in the United
States is currently in a state of transition. On the one hand, labor union
representation continues to decline in absolute numbers and relative
importance. On the other hand, statutory and judicial sources have
recognized new individual employee rights.
Union density in the U.S. private sector has declined steadily over
the past thirty years. The proportion of unionized employees in the
nonagricultural work force has fallen from over 30% in 1960 to
approximately 16% in 1990.277 Although union density also has
declined in other industrialized countries during this period, the United
States' experience has been far more extreme.278 At present, the role
of unions in the United States is considerably weaker than the role of
unions in most other industrialized nations. With this decline in union
strength, employees suffer a loss of voice in the workplace that even
individual protection against wrongful discharge cannot replace.
The ability of remaining unions to accomplish their organizational
and collective bargaining goals under the NLRA regulatory scheme is
also increasingly suspect. A growing number of critics complain that
the NLRA's lack of effective remedies provides little deterrence against
unlawful employer conduct.
279
Two examples illustrate the NLRA's remedial shortcomings. First,
a common employer tactic in opposing union organizational campaigns
is to discharge the leading employee organizers. While the NLRA
makes this conduct unlawful, it does little to deter its occurrence. The
usual remedy under the NLRA for illegal discharge of an employee
organizer is a cease and desist order coupled with reinstatement and
back pay.28 The NLRA does not provide for fines, punitive damages
or any other "penalty," and the discharged employee has a duty to
compensation or the severance pay guaranteed by law. The employees took their case to a labor
tribunal which ruled in their favor and authorized them to seize the plant and all of the remaining
machinery. In addition, the tribunal impounded and ultimately gave to the employees all of the
merchandise and machinery that had been removed from the plant. See Tod Robberson, Mexican Labor
Shows Who's Boss: Workers Win Suit, Now Own Factory, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1993, at A24.
277. See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 55, at 578; 142 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 180-81 (1993)
(reporting findings of the U.S. Department of Labor that 1992 union membership comprised 15.8% of
the total wage and salary work force and comprised 11.5% of the private sector work force).
278. See GOULD, supra note 274, at 14-15, tbl. 2.1 (depicting union membership as a percentage
of wage and salaried employees in various industrialized countries).
279. See, e.g., id. at ch. 5; WEILER, supra note 46, at Ch. 6; Charles Craver, The National Labor
Relations Act Must be Revised to Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 397 (1992).
280. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988).
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mitigate losses by finding alternative work. This "make whole"
approach provides little in the way of deterrence for employers who
realize that they can chill union organization efforts by immediately
firing employee organizers. 8' The lack of remedial clout is com-
pounded by the fact that lengthy procedural delays in resolving the
resulting unfair labor practice charges further operate to dissipate union
support.282
The NLRA's relatively weak remedial scheme also lessens the
effectiveness of the bargaining mandate. The only remedy recognized
under the NLRA for a party's refusal to engage in good faith bargaining
is an order requiring the party to return to the bargaining table. The
Supreme Court has ruled that the NLRB is without power to impose
substantive contract terms in the event of a violation, even where the
NLRB has concluded that an employer acted in a manner designed to
283frustrate the bargaining process. Thus, an employer may engage in
protracted "surface" bargaining with little fear of meaningful administra-
tive intervention. 4
An additional shortcoming of the NLRA scheme to protect worker
rights results from the employer's ability to hire permanent replacements
to fill the positions of striking employees. As noted above,285 an
employer may lawfully decline to reinstate a striker at the conclusion of
a strike so long as a replacement employee continues to occupy the
position. This practice significantly undercuts the power of unions in
two respects. First, the threat of permanent replacement serves to deter
strikes as well as to limit the union's ability to use the threat of a strike
as leverage in collective bargaining.8 6  Second, the permanent
replacements have the right to vote in representation elections, while the
voting rights of displaced strikers typically cease twelve months after
the beginning of a strike.287 Accordingly, these electoral rules permit
an employer to rid itself of a union by pushing the employees into a
281. See Weiler, supra note 178, at 1788-90.
282. As of 1988, the median length of time from the filing of an unfair labor practice charge until
adjudication by the National Labor Relations Board was 762 days. When a party sought judicial review
of the Board's decision, the median interval between charge and resolution jumped to more than three
years. See GOULD, supra note 274, at 158-59.
283. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
284. The problem of "surface" bargaining is particularly acute when an employer uses this tactic
to avoid the consummation of an initial collective bargaining agreement. At this stage, the employer's
objective often is not to achieve favorable terms but rather to undercut employee support for the newly
elected union. See, e.g., GOULD, supra note 274, at 222.
285. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
286. See Daniel Pollitt, Mackay Radio: Turn It Off, Tune It Out, 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 295, 296-97
(1991).
287. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1988).
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strike and then hiring permanent replacements who will vote to decertify
the union in an eventual election."'
A corresponding growth in the availability of individual employee
rights has accompanied this decline in the effectiveness of collective
rights. An increasing number of statutes regulates the terms of the
employment relationship independent of the collective bargaining
process. Both legislative and judicial bodies increasingly recognize new
limitations on an employer's right to terminate employees at will.2 9
The reach of these individual rights, however, is uneven. Some
employees enjoy protection against discrimination in the workplace, but
others do not. Moreover, only certain employees may challenge a
dismissal under contract or tort principles.
The private litigation model for the enforcement of these individual
rights further limits their availability. Because litigation is expensive
and time-consuming, many lower-paid employees lack access to the
only forum in which they may assert their newly-created individual
rights.290
Despite the recent explosion in individual employee rights, the at-
will rule still remains the usual employment relationship for most
American workers. The new individual rights do not protect workers
as workers, but only certain types of individuals who happen to be
workers. As such, the United States stands virtually alone among
industrialized nations in failing to provide general statutory protection
against unjust dismissals.2 9'
VI. LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE
A. Mexico
Since the economic crisis of the 1980s, Mexico has opened its
economy, eliminating many of the protectionist policies of the past.
Now many industries must modernize in order to survive international
competition.292 Most actors in the Mexican labor relations system
agree that reforms are necessary in order to adjust to these challenges.
Management claims that it needs greater control in the workplace
regarding floor management and layoffs in order to compete in the
288. See WEILER, supra note 46, at 266-67.
289. See supra notes 113-125 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 127.
291. See Estreicher, supra note 128, at 287; Summers, supra note 112, at 508-509.
292. For example, much of the textile industry still uses machinery imported from England in the
1800s. See Guillermo Correa, Con maquinaria de un siglo afrontard al TLC la industria textil,
PROCESO, Aug. 17, 1992, at 26.
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international market.293  However, many labor leaders and supporters
fear that labor will lose hard-won gains if management is allowed this
greater flexibility. 294 They believe that the Mexican government is
now more sympathetic to business concerns than it is to workers'
interests and that the current labor relations system allows management
to benefit from this shift in governmental support.295 Some indicators
suggest that labor has lost influence over the past decade. Government-
affiliated union leaders openly express dissatisfaction with government
policies,296 and far fewer labor representatives win state and national
elections. 297  These problems suggest that the old Mexican labor
relations system has failed to protect workers adequately during this
period of transition.
B. The United States
The international marketplace will continue to have an impact on
U.S. labor and employment policy as well. Competition from foreign
companies paying lower wage rates has helped cause the U.S. decline
in unionization,298 and this trend is likely to continue.
A decline in collective rights, however, will produce pressure to
enhance individual rights. For example, the Uniform Law Commis-
sioners recently approved a Model Employment Termination Act that
would require an employer to establish just cause in order to discharge
virtually any employee.2 99  While only one state, Montana, has
293. See Laura Carlsen, A Common Goal, Bus. MEX., Sept. 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Arcnws File. In the effort to modernize during the 1980s, many companies aimed for
"flexibility" in labor contracts. See Bensusin, supra note 24, at 14-18. This means that in an effort
to increase productivity, there is greater leeway for management in firing and hiring and in shop-floor
management. See Laura Carlsen, Competing in the Workplace, BuS. MEX., Sept. 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnws File. Critics claim that companies have imposed these contract reforms
unilaterally. See, e.g., Arnulfo Arteaga Garcia, Ford: un largo y sinuoso conflicto, in Negociaci6n y
conflicto laboral en Mxico 141, 158 (Graciela BensusAn & Samuel Leon eds., 1992) (illustrating the
Ford dispute). Some younger labor leaders, however, openly advocate greater cooperation between
labor and management in Mexico's efforts to modernize and become internationally competitive. See
Salvador Corro, El sindicato de Herndndez Judrez: moderno, concertadory sumiso, PROCESO, May 18,
1992, at 18.
294. See Salvador Corro, En los hechos, la Ley Federal del Trabajo ha sido modificada: CTM,
PRocEso, Aug. 31, 1992, at 28; Bensusin & Garcia, supra note 24, at 16-18; Eugenia Martinez et al.,
Breaking Mexican Labour: North American Free Trade Agreement, CANADIAN DIMENSION, Nov. 1992,
at 21, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnws File.
295. Bensusan, supra note 24, at 36.
296. See Salvador Corro, "No estamos contentos ni nos satisface, pero no nos queda de otra
dyeron los lideres obreros, PROCESO, Oct. 26, 1992, at 28; Corro, supra note 293.
297. Jeff Silverstein, Labor's Laissez-Faire Economics: Union Leaders (and Members) Want to
Keep Their Jobs, Bus. MEX., Dec. 1992, at 20, 20.
298. See, e.g., GOULD, supra, note 274, at 11-17.
299. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT § 3 (1991). Under the Model Act, an employee
may waive just cause protection only through an agreement providing for payment of a minimum
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enacted legislation resembling the Model Act,300 this proposal will
undoubtedly set the agenda for a future examination of the employment
relationship.
The United States, however, also must explore reinvigorating
collective rights. Only a mechanism that empowers workers as a
collective group will provide them with a voice in workplace decision
making. Other industrialized countries have faced international compe-
tition without a similar free-fall in collective organization. 30 ' For the
future, the United States will benefit more from examining the labor
relations structures in those countries than from criticizing the systems
of its neighbors.
C. Another Model?
What is needed is a labor relations system that assures workers
significant participation in the transition process while allowing busi-
nesses to make the changes necessary to survive. Although Mexico and
the United States may be able to learn some lessons from each other,
both also should look elsewhere for guidance. In Germany, for
instance, both workers and management have made sacrifices to meet
the challenge of international competition without the great disruptions
in employment seen in the United States and Mexico.
German labor relations law establishes a dual representational
structure that combines elements of both the U.S. and Mexican mod-
els.30 2 In Germany, large national unions represent employees in
collective bargaining with equally large organizations of employers.
These negotiations establish industry-wide contracts governing
compensation, benefits, and other terms of employment.30 3 At the
local level, German law provides for the election of employee works
councils in any workplace with five or more employees. The works
councils do not have the right to strike but instead have a far-reaching
right of participation and co-determination with respect to most
workplace issues .304 Labor unions in both the United States and
amount of severance pay that is graduated by length of service. Id. at § 4.
300. See Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1989) (prohibiting employers from discharging
employees without good cause, or in violation of either public policy or express provisions of the
employer's own written personnel policy).
301. See GOULD, supra note 274.
302. For an overview of the German system, see Rudolf Buschmann, Worker Participation and
Collective Bargaining in Germany, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 26 (1993); Carol Rasnic, Germany's Statutory
Works Councils and Employee Codetermination: A Model for the United States?, 14 LOY. L.A. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 275 (1992).
303. See Rasnic, supra note 302, at 288-93.
304. See Buschmann, supra note 302, at 29-3 1.
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Mexico have resisted the works council model as a structure that enables
management to coopt workers and to weaken unions.305 Germany's
experience suggests, however, that a parallel system of strong national
unions and more cooperative workplace institutions may enhance both
collective bargaining and worker participation.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the United States, much of the debate over the NAFTA treaty
has presumed the inadequacy of Mexican labor law to protect workers'
interests. A closer examination belies that assumption. The Mexican
legal regime mandates many of the same basic rights of the U.S. law.
Beyond these basics, Mexican law is more protective of worker rights
in many significant respects, such as in requiring cause for dismissal, in
prohibiting strike replacements, and in mandating such benefits as profit
sharing, medical coverage, and housing assistance.
Many of the problems that do exist in the Mexican workplace are
the result of limited economic resources. Some Mexican workers do not
enjoy all of the guarantees that the labor law provides, simply because
the Mexican industrial base is still relatively small, and the only
employment opportunities are in family-run operations that cannot
realistically be regulated.30 6  Mexican workers also suffer from
comparatively low wages due to an excess labor supply. These
problems, however, primarily result from an underdeveloped economy
and economic forces beyond the government's immediate control rather
than a systematic disregard of workers' interests.
Our comparison of U.S. and Mexican labor and employment law
reveals weaknesses in both systems. The United States provides far less
protection for workers than is the norm not only in Mexico, but in most
industrialized countries. This continuation of the traditional U.S.
laissez-faire system is exemplified by such practices as employer
resistance to employee organization, the hiring of permanent strike
replacements, at-will dismissal, and the lack of employee voice in
workplace decision making. In Mexico, manipulation by management
and the government of labor law regulations, such as those providing for
exclusive representation and union registration, has thwarted efforts by
some workers to organize "independent" unions or to organize at all.
And while close ties between labor and the government have provided
labor with some advantages, those ties have probably moderated the
305. See LASTRA LASTRA, supra note 13, at 315-17; Freeman & Rogers, supra note 31, at 37-38.
306. See supra note 43.
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demands of Mexican labor as well.
The labor relations systems in the United States and in Mexico both
need reform, because neither fully serves its intended purpose of
furthering the interests of workers. Both countries should introduce
reforms that would more truly protect organizational rights, collective
bargaining efforts, and rank and file participation in decision making.
Perhaps both Mexico and the United States would benefit from looking
elsewhere for reform models. Indeed, a blend of the best aspects of the
two systems may be desirable. For example, the successes of the
German labor relations system suggest that strong and adversarial labor
unions can coexist with institutionalized and cooperative labor-
management committees that allow worker participation in basic
decision making.
The NAFTA treaty does not modify the labor laws of either the
United States or Mexico. Instead, the NAFTA labor side-agreement
provides a forum that challenges each country to enforce its own labor
laws fully. As such, the side agreement provides an opportunity for the
two countries to work together to improve their understandings of each
other's systems, and a challenge for each country to make the changes
necessary to ensure that labor's interests are not further eroded by a
changing world economy.
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